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Free Will is NOT An Illusion
Many scientists think that free-will is an illusion. That is, intentions, choices, and decisions are made by subconscious mind, which only lets the conscious mind know what was willed after the fact. This argument was promoted long ago by scholars like Darwin, Huxley, and Einstein. Many modern scientists also hold that position and have even performed experiments since the 1980s they say prove it.
These experiments supposedly show that the brain makes a subconscious decision before it is realized consciously. In the typical experiment supporting illusory free will, a subject is asked to voluntarily press a button at any time and notice the position of a clock marker when they think they first willed the movement. At the same time, brain activity is monitored over the part of the brain that controls the mechanics of the movement. The startling typical observation is that subjects show brain activity changes before they say they intended to make the movement. In other words the brain issued the command before the conscious mind had a chance to decide to move. All this happens in less than a second, but various scientists have interpreted this to mean that the subconscious mind made the decision to move and the conscious mind only realized the decision later.
In a paper published in Advances in Cognitive Psychology, I challenge the whole series of experiments performed since the 1980s purported to show that intentions, choices, and decisions are made subconsciously, with conscious mind being informed after the fact. These experiments do not test what they are intended to test and are misinterpreted to support the view of illusory free will.
My criticisms focus on three main points: 1) timing of when a free-will event occurred requires introspection, and other research shows that introspective estimates of event timing are not accurate, 2) simple finger movements may be performed without much conscious thought and certainly not representative of the conscious decisions and choices required in high-speed conversation or situations where the subconscious mind cannot know ahead of time what to do, and 3) the brain activity measures have been primitive and incomplete.
I point out 12 categories of what I regard as flawed thinking about free will. Some of the more obvious issues that many scientists have glossed over include:
- Decisions are not often instantaneous (certainly not on a scale of a fraction of a second).
- Conscious realization that a decision has been made is delayed from the actual decision, and these may be two distinct processes.
- Decision making is not the only mental process going on in such tasks.
- Some willed action, as when first learning to play a musical instrument or touch type must be freely willed because the subconscious mind cannot know ahead of time what to do.
- Free-will experiments have relied too much on awareness of actions and time estimation of accuracy.
- Extrapolating from such simple experiments to all mental life is not justified.
- Conflicting data and interpretations have been ignored.
A basic problem is that scientists do not yet have a good independent brain-function measure of the conscious generation of intentions, choices, or decisions. Without such a measure, it is not possible to measure the time at which a willed action occurs.
My paper concludes with a series of suggestions that scientists can use to test free-will issues. Equally important, the research I suggest would not only help identify reliable markers of conscious decision-making but would also help scientists learn what the brain does to achieve consciousness in the first place.
The implications of this debate are profound. It determines our world view of whether we are victims of genetics and environment or bear responsibility for our intentions, decisions, and choices. I contend we are responsible for what we make of our brains and for our choices and decisions in life. In a free-will world, people can choose to extricate themselves from many kinds of misfortune — not to mention make the right choices that can prevent misfortune.
In the real world, subconscious and conscious minds interact and share duties. Subconscious mind governs simple or well-learned tasks, like habits or ingrained prejudices, while conscious mind deals with tasks that are complex or novel, like first learning to ride a bike or play sheet music. Most deliberate new learning has to be mediated by free will, because subconscious mind has not yet had a chance to learn.
Reference
Klemm, W. (2010). Free will debates: Simple experiments are not so simple Advances in Cognitive Psychology, 6 (-1), 47-65 DOI: 10.2478/v10053-008-0076-2
W. R. Klemm, DVM, PhD
W. R. Klemm, DVM, PhD, is Professor of Neuroscience and Professor of Veterinary Integrative Biosciences at Texas A&M University. He has written several books including Improving Everyday Memory, Core Ideas in Neuroscience, Blame Game. How To Win It, an Armadillos.163 Responses
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Mr Klemm,
Could you not have posted this comment? If yes, why didn’t you then?
Also, let’s assume you’re faced with a certain choice and you’re trying to figure out what to do by thinking about the consequences, by remembering and extrapolating from your past experiences, by evaluation your current mood, etc.
Let’s now also assume that the EXACT same situation exists in a parallel universe (faced with the same choice, having had the same experiences, remembering the same things, etc). Could this ‘you’ come to a different conclusion that you in this world?
If yes then what made the difference? And how could you get a different result with exactly the same parameters?
Thank you.
I don’t really believe in free will.
But having the exact same parameters in both parallel universes would mean that you would need to measure both either simultaneously or in sequence…
Maybe thats just not possbile in this pico-world to compare apples with apples …on such a minute level of the neuronal webs that make up a mind.
So maybe we can live in a deterministic world and still have something that resembles free will ( its quacks and walks like a duck…lets call it a duck)
Embedded in the conclusion “I don’t believe in free will” is a choice. You feel hungry, but the resulting behavior is not predetermined before you make such. To say you choose not to choose is contradictory.
funny duck comment, but no free will means we are all robots, so instead of calling it a duck, lets call it instinct
and if the subconscious mind made a decision, wouldn’t that make it conscious
This parallel universe example seems to assume that the antecedent events (past experience, etc.) were not influenced at all by free choices. Doesn’t that make your argument circular?
Let’s just take a few pieces of your argumentation:
“the subconscious mind cannot know ahead of time what to do”
Is that true?
Or:
“subconscious mind has not yet had a chance to learn”
Is that true?
How do you know? It is called “subconscious” after all, isn’t it?
This is a complicated subject … great to keep investigating it!
My comments were meant to emphasize that the subconscious mind cannot know (and learn how to respond) in advance for NEW situations and contingencies which the brain has never confronted.
Now, it comes to mind the possibility that subconscious mind might have a kind of free will. That is, perhaps brain can make some choices and decisions subconsciously with a degree of freedom, not completely programmed by experience or genetics. This leads into consideration of determinism, and the possibility that brain actions can be probabilistic. Certain, in a Bayesian sense, this is probably partially true. Some of these ideas are discussed in my forthcoming book from Singer, “Atoms of Mind.”
How is the readiness potential taken into consideration?
I have an extensive discussion of the readiness potential (and its misinterpretation) in the original paper. It is too extensive to cover here. See Klemm, W. (2010). Free will debates: Simple experiments are not so simple Advances in Cognitive Psychology, 6 (-1), 47-65 DOI: 10.2478/v10053-008-0076-2
more mature understandings of brain, mind, awareness, intention, attention, conditioning will further the understanding of this … and also, using languages other than english to grasp the concepts underlying the investigations … english is simply too clunky
I agree that the experiment is flawed, but I do think free will is illusory. For me to have free will would imply that my thought process is somehow separate from my environment- that is, not a reaction to stimuli. I only can react. If I decide to have yogurt rather than cereal for breakfast, that is the result of (for instance) a built-up preference for yogurt, not some on the fly decision that’s being made. It’s a conditioned response. I can’t think of an example of making a decision separate from your conditioning/personality. Anything you do is a result of what has happened to you in the past, your genes, etc. Nothing happens “in the moment” separate from the past.
@Mycelia: While your argument does hold true for many, many cases of human behavior (quite possibly the vast majority in fact), I’m not so sure it holds in every case. Creative works for example. Is all art merely the result of the past influencing what we create, or is true innovation spontaneous? Revelation seems possible to me as a source for novel actions to be made that are not merely the constructions of past experiences.
That’s my two cents, but obviously more research is required.
@ashwatta:
> Is all art merely the result of the past influencing what we create, or is true innovation spontaneous?
Could you give an example of ‘spontaneous true innovation’? Innovation doesn’t just come out of the blue. Even innovative things or ideas rely on stuff or ideas that existed before. Nothing is created ex nihilo. How could it?
And spontaneous ideas aren’t the result of a conscious decision anyway. They just ‘creep up’. And once there they’re not any different from any other stimuli we’re exposed to (and we react to).
Also, people can’t imagine what they haven’t experienced, in some way, first. A blind person can never come up with ‘blue’. A person that doesn’t know that elephants exist can’t just come up with one. Etc.
There are quite a few recent studies in the psychology of music that shed light on human creativity. In them, computers have been trained to improvise jazz music. People train computers in a few different ways, mostly neural networks or note/scale libraries. These two different ways are how musicians can learn improvisation techniques–by copying from others and/or learning the theories behind scales. It turns out that computers can improvise decently well (more training would be needed to teach jazz techniques of velocity, intricate note lengths, vibrato, etc.).
So that goes to show, even in the most human fields of art such as music improvisation, computers can be taught to be creative.
@Mycelia: good and valid points.
No,no, no. I do not accept your premise that free will has to exempt one from interacting with the environment. Environment presents options. Which option one chooses may be automated subconsciously, but why would you assume that free will cannot exist in the context of environment. Conscious awareness of what is in the environment enables freely willed choices to be more informed. Likewise, why can’t freely willed choices be informed by past learning and programming? I do not claim that anything the brain does occurs “in the moment” without influence of the past.
The subsequent postings on creativity are important, but I think you have misconstrued them. The issue is not whether creativity is influenced by the past, but whether one can freely choose which creative idea to pursue and choose.
I sadly** agree with you.
**Isn’t it a [the most] depressing idea?
What a wonderful investigation! I enjoyed reading this and doing some of my own research on the side as well. We would all like to think that human beings have the ability to make their own decisions in life, but what if it is all just a dream. On the other hand it is called the “subconscience” mind for a reason. What a puzzling concept.
Hello,
i do support the idea that it’s not an illusion.
though i ‘m a little bit against the title of the subject, because i think there is a difference between “free will” and “conscience”
there is always this race between the subconscience and conscience minds where subconscience is trying to take over the conscience one.
why i assumed there is this race, because i remember at some point of time, one could get to the result of a mathematical operation before performing the calculations.
or generally can think ahead without going through the proper sequence for analysis.
eventually the learning process is very much affecting the outcome of this “battle”.
subsconscience is definitely faster than the conscience one which by any means is reliving for the conscience who becomes lazy and less responsible and the “free will” as well is benefiting from the fact that it wants to reach a conclusion for an issue that fastest possible.
that’s why again i make a difference between the free will and sub and consc. minds.
so basically subconcsience acts like a database, very unique one, because it has this powerful combination of memory storage of one’s personal experience and human kind experience.
at the end the database needs to be filled with information to operate.
and this happens in someone’s conscience.
I am intrigued by your statement: “there is always this race between the subconscience and conscience minds where subconscience is trying to take over the conscience one.” We apparently have a language problem here, because in English “conscience” means something quite different from “conscious.”
But back to your point about the “race.” I would put the matter in the opposite way: there is always this race where conscious mind is trying to take over the decisions and choices of the subconscious mind. This lies at the heart of an assertion in a paper in “Cognitive Neuroscience” where the author asserts that consciousness may have no adaptive value. On the contrary, I think the capacity evolved and appears apparently only in higher animals precisely because it has adaptive value. One can go on at length postulating what those adaptations might be, but let’s not take time to do that here, except to point out that it is otherwise hard to explain why animals with consciousness have larger and a more flexible behavioral repertoire.
This is a fascinating article. What do you think of this scenario?
Two children – identical twins – grow up in the same house, same environment, and both are sexually abused. One grows up to perpetrate the same kinds of abuse as an adult, the other abhors the very thought of it.
or, two boys who grow up in the same neighborhood, both with a single mother who is a drug addict. Both end up joining gangs in their early teens in order to belong. Both are faced with the dilemna – say at the same exact age – of having to commit an abominable crime. One makes the choice to go ahead with the crime, one does not.
I have a hard time believing we have no free will because I know I personally am presented with decisions constantly. I know there are primitive urges that creep up that I will not entertain if the time or place is not right. I know that I am able, for instance, to think, “this child is misbehaving and it is making me angry” and then I am able go through a series of choices in my mind, ranging from the urge to smack the child reactively to trying to restrain the child from what they are doing in a very non-violent, uninvasive way.
It seems to me, the brain activity which is noted in the experiment could be this kind of process. A person given the choice of pushing a button whenever they want to may be thinking:
Has it been long enough?
How long was it between the last two times I pushed to button?
I wonder what it will tell them if I wait a moment before I push it?
Oh yeah, the button. (I got distracted)
We have no way of knowing what the split second “subconscious” thoughts may have been, therefore any conclusion drawn from this is speculative.
While I find this interesting, I’m not certain it falls in the right category to be included in the Steppers Wisdom blog carnival. Free will is certainly a twelve-step consideration, so for that reason I am still considering including your entry.
@shen:
> Two children – identical twins – grow up in the same house, same environment, and both are sexually abused. One grows up to perpetrate the same kinds of abuse as an adult, the other abhors the very thought of it.
That’s not a proof for free will though. The children surely have NOT experienced the same things (or met the same people) 100%. So of course there can be a difference in reaction to a certain event: different input, different output. Doesn’t mean that either had a choice.
Biologically twins will diverge from the moment they become twins: not every cell division will be identical, not every gene will be expressed in just the same way, variations in protein production,…
…and by the time their nervous system starts to develop they are already different. The connectivity in their brains will differ. Their experiences in the womb will differ, even according to how much of the blood supply and nutrient supply they receive.
The amazing thing is that twins are as alike as they are. Difference should be expected.
Shen:
I agree with you, b but also agree with your respondent who pointed out this is not very compelling proof.
By the way, your comments on button press thinking are “right on.” I made some of the same points in the original paper.
Unfortunately free will does not seem to exist. I’ve seen no logical argument thus far that indicates that we do. I’ve seen plenty of evidence and simple philosophical-logical arguments that demonstrate that it can’t exist.
In order for free will to exist, a person has to have the ability to make a choice — and this means that the future can’t be determined. So most theistic religious folks out there who believe in an omniscient “God” who knows the past, present, and future — demonstrate that free will can’t exist — due to this future being known. If this “God” doesn’t know the future, then that “God” fails to be omnipotent and by definition, fails to be “God”. Ironically, it is these same religious folks who have no choice but to believe that free will — even though true free will’s existence would contradict\ the very idea of an all knowing “God”.
Religion aside, in order for people to believe in free will, they have to agree that the world is at least adequately determined. If everything was random and unpredictable, then the choices that you think you make or the actions you perform would be inconsistent with each other. Paradoxically, that very determinism implies the absence of free will, for the more deterministic your actions become, a more fixed path is set and alternatives disappear. On top of this, uncertainty or indeterminism (currently proven with strong evidence in quantum theory) suggests that at the most fundamental level of existence, matter/energy behaves in a random manner (no 100% predictability). Unfortunately, this just creates another mechanism for lack of free will, because randomness is still something out of our control. So technically speaking, the fact that the universe operates under either determinism, or indeterminism, or a combination of both — implies that the universe operates in a way that eliminates free choice altogether.
To summarize, people are products of their genes, environment, and chance — thus no free will. Even if free will was possible, which logically it isn’t, it would comprise the smallest fraction of reality with the majority being determined or random.
In order for free will to exist, we’d have to get rid of both determinism and indeterminism (chance), which then we would have nothing left. We’d have to have people that are “causa sui” to use the Latin term, or “creators of their own cause” (thus god-like). You have to abandon logic altogether to believe in free will — which one can do, but then can never have a scientific discussion regarding the matter. Does this mean that life is meaningless? Not at all. It means that although I don’t have any choice in the matter, I am able to experience life, beauty, variety, a slice of unpredictability and love — which makes life worth living.
Lage,
A couple of posts on issues of determinism:
http://ronmurp.net/2012/01/08/ontological-determinism-epistemological-indeterminism-laplaces-demon/
http://ronmurp.net/2012/01/13/re-running-the-universe-determinism-indeterminism-quantum-stuff/
Ron,
Yes, I agree with the statement in the first article that says “…even if the universe is ontologically deterministic, it must be epistemological indeterminate to internal entities.”
This goes in-line with the Kantian philosophy stating that the “I” can not know itself — that is, the seer can’t see itself. The best way that the seer or “I” can know itself is through intersubjective communication/reflection with others. Otherwise we really just know the “me” (the self as we see it), rather than the “I” (the self as it really is objectively).
I would say that ontological determinism/indeterminism is much more relevant to our discussion on the subject of free will, than epistemological determinism/indeterminism is. It does not matter what we can know or not know as members, sub-systems, or participants of this universe or system. Quantum theory implies that this epistemological indeterminism is true and I have no disagreement with it. All this says is that WE, the observers can’t know the past, present or future with 100% certainty, because we actually are unable to isolate ourselves from the experiment (as observers, we become part of the system we’re observing in several ways).
What matters more is the fact that we don’t even need empirical data to demonstrate that logically, if ontological determinism and/or indeterminism exist, then free will is negated and can’t exist. I believe that the universe is governed by adequate (macro) determinism with a fundamental indeterminism at it’s foundation — thus randomness mixed in with a causal chain of events. Either way, no free will can exist. I haven’t heard one good argument to refute the impossibility of free will — and I don’t believe it’s possible without abandoning logic altogether (which religious theists having already abandoned it). I’ve come to accept that I have no free will. I think it’s very difficult for most people (religious theists, those who believe in moral responsibility, pride, etc.) to accept this because it undermines their very religion and thus their identity. It demonstrates that their accomplishments aren’t really due to their willful effort or willful talents because they had no control over such skills obtained. I still appreciate the beauty, variety and love in the world, even if I have no control over it, and even if the meaning of concepts like love, variety, etc., are changed. It’s a beautiful universe we live in, indeed! I also agree with the general consensus of quantum theory (mentioned in the second article you linked for me) — that if we were to reverse time and start with the same initial conditions say 1 billion years ago (any arbitrary amount of time in the past), that the universe would play out differently. This is what quantum theory implies, that is, an ontological indeterminism at the fundamental level (i.e. randomness). This would also explain why the universe appears to have otherwise arbitrary physical constants, and the ability to support carbon-based life. It’s because time is infinite, and the universe has had an infinite number of possibilities to “try” before reaching the one that allowed those physical constants to eventually allow life as we define it. Looking at the anthropic principle, the universe evolved the way it did, simply because our existence as self-aware entities contemplating the issue requires it to be so. These theories that I happen to agree with (some of them self-discovered) assume that time is infinite and/or the big bang is a cycle that repeats over time with new variety every time due to quantum randomness. Good articles.
Yes. I’ve suggested some reasons why people might object to non-free-will in my discussion with Alexis, below. I’m not irreversibly committed to causality (hence determinism or indeterminism) as being the basis on which the universe works. But if one rejects causality to allow in free-will, in order to make it ‘free’ of a prior causes, then it also releases our reality from the causal influence of the ‘will’ – our will is free, but can’t do anything. much less make a choice. Either way, free-will is screwed.
I thought that while Dr. Klemm makes some valuable arguments about the problematic nature of the experiments that purport to show that free will is an illusion, he actually sidesteps the fundamental questions about the nature of free will. In the end, I think he’s arguing against a phantom of his own creation.
I started a new blog recently and was motivated to write up a more detailed response. Check it out!
http://cognitivephilosophy.net/consciousness/free-will-is-not-what-you-think-it-is/
Good point. The thrust of the original paper was to challenge the research that scientists and philosophers use to argue that free will is an illusion. There is certainly room for ideas on just what free will is (but first, one has to concede it may exist).
Hi Dr. Klemm, thanks for the response. Had you written a blog post discussing how research into the subconscious causes of behavior doesn’t necessarily destroy the notion of free will, I’d wholeheartedly agree with you, and mention so in my post. But your post is titled “free will is NOT an illusion” and you seem to indicate that proving this research wrong is enough justification to say that. That’s where I disagree. A recourse to consciousness is just begging the question.
There was another article in the BBC recently saying free will had been proven because animals engage in probabilistic, rather than deterministic behavior. I wrote another post discussing that idea as well. http://cognitivephilosophy.net/consciousness/this-still-isnt-free-will/ I think these debates can benefit from a bit more rigorous formal philosophical logic, and is implicitly what I’m getting at in those two responses.
I think you’re right though and that the debate IS important in the role it plays in human responsibility and ethics. Though I think even that debate is misguided, as I discuss here: http://cognitivephilosophy.net/consciousness/what-we-miss-in-the-free-will-debate/
To me, the label of “free will” isn’t as important as understanding the causes of human behavior and decision making, and how that understanding can benefit the social and political systems we set up. I’m personally very skeptical of free will, and while I think aspects of the debate are important, whether free will exists or not is somewhat besides the point to me. It’s what we do with our knowledge of causation and intentionality that I really think is the important discussion. Free will is important in so far as it informs that conversation.
I agree that free will issues are not illuminated well by probabilistic arguments. The idea has been advanced that animals must have free will because their behavior can be more probabilistic than deterministic. For a given situation, there may a range of options and the probability that any one response choice will occur varies with the option. However, this does not mean, as the BBC authors seem to imply, that the behavior is freely chosen and not deterministic. The net behavior IS deterministic, constrained by the probability density function (PDF) for that particular scenario. It is like pulling different colored jelly beans out of a jar: if there are 30% green, 30% yellow, 20% brown, and 20% black, this constitutes a PDF. When reaching into the jar to pull one out at a time, the result is random only within the constraints of the PDF. Eventually after all are selected, you MUST end up with a pre-determined number of each colored bean.
So I don’t see how this supports the idea of free will. An animal can be programmed by experience to have a certainly probability of response to any given contingency. The total response is governed by that PDF, not free choice.
Yet I do favor the idea of free will, at least in humans. A human gets to construct the PDF for any given behavior. The construction process can be an act of free choice. In any given hour of the day, I have the option of picking up a cigarette. If I am a smoker, there is a certain probability for each given hour whether I will do that. But I can construct a new PDF in which the probability is CHOSEN to be zero. My subsequent actions are governed by that PDF. But what deterministic process caused me to re-set the PDF? I say it was free will.
You say that we should “not concern ourselves with the debate over free will, but about how our knowledge of causation and intention should inform how we interact with each other,” as if free-will is irrelevant to the issue. But consider the possible causes of a given intention or act. The options include an unlearned biological propensity operating within a deterministic PDF, a probabilistically determined range of actions determined by prior learning or experience, a highly constrained set of choices created by the environmental contingencies that demand action but only allow minimal possibilities, and — what else: a choice to act that is made by a freely chosen probability. All behaviors have a certain probability of occurring, from zero to 100%. The issue is what creates the probability? Is it something externally imposed? … biologically imposed? … or possibly cognitively chosen?
Clearly,humans make cognitively chosen decisions. These are often based on decisions on what is the right or best thing to do under a given circumstance. Such decisions create a PDF that does constrain our responses. But humans are free in many cases to make the decision as to what is the right or best thing to do, and thus create a corresponding PDF,
Clearly, humans make cognitively chosen decisions. These are often based on decisions on what is the right or best thing to do under a given circumstance. Such decisions create a PDF that does constrain our responses. But humans are free in many cases to make the decision as to what is the right or best thing to do, and thus create a corresponding PDF.
Nobody forces me to quit smoking. I can make that choice freely. Now you might say, it is not free because I have been convinced by data and others that smoking is bad for me. Once I believe that, my choice does become constrained because I have created new PDF where smoking probability is 0. But I did have the alternative of not believing the data or others or of wanting to die happily from the “coffin nails” that given me so much pleasure. I could have decided the tradeoff favored enjoying the benefits of smoking, perhaps even rationalizing I won’t get cancer no matter what. Are these not free-will choices?
Well since you asked, no, they aren’t free will choices.
I agree that there is nothing to demonstrate that we do not have free will. But nor is there anything to demonstrate that we do, beyond how we personally feel about it. But we know how flaky personal perceptions can be.
What would it feel like to us if we didn’t have free will, if we were just very complex automata that bumbled along in the world, doing some stuff, and behaving ‘as if’ we had free will? Wouldn’t it be just like this?
I see the point you are making in the article. But are decisions made by the conscious mind really “free will”? Are they not still a “simple” computational product of the current state of the “consciousness” and its interaction with reality? Physical structures, synapses formed, chemical balances and distributions, etc, etc.
Just because the consciousness appears to be more linked to our “sensory human experience” does this really mean any “free will” is really taking place?
One can even flip the script and say that the subconscious is more indicative of “free will”, as it represents our basest and truest instincts, not bound by societal interpretations and limitations. It’s what our system really, truly wants to do. We can say that the overall system is equipped for better survival and propagation due to a restrictive layer otherwise known as the “consciousness”. Can you really negate this perspective and at the same time not negate elements of the “consciousness = free will” proponency?
So what is free will? Seems like a wishful dream.
To add to my comment, maybe the researchers did prove that no free will truly exists, though surely before this study — by simply demonstrating that human decision making is a product of a structured physical system — no matter how many layers you slice it into.
Al:
You are in tune with Greg who pointed out that we don’t have a good handle on what “free will.” A common definition is that is a conscious choice or decision among multiple options in which more than one choice or decision could have been made. More needs to be said.
As to your comment “One can even flip the script and say that the subconscious is more indicative of “free will”, as it represents our basest and truest instincts, not bound by societal interpretations and limitations. It’s what our system really, truly wants to do,” let me say this. To say that subconscious mind “wants” to do is a misuse of language. What subconscious mind does is largely programmed by past experience and learning. That is probable outcomes are biased and to a degree probabilistically predictable. I leave open the possibility that there might be such a thing as “subconscious” free will, as mentioned in one of my earlier replies.
Free will is simply incompatible with physics in general. Believing in free will is an outlandish concept requiring more faith than even believing in God.
Claiming that the physical brain has free will is no different from claiming that a radio has free will. Indeterminism does not support free will, but rather unpredictable will, meaning you can’t control your decisions, but your decisions are unpredictable. Determinism does not support free will, but rather predictable will, meaning you can’t control your decisions, and your decisions are predictable.
Even without Libet’s experiment his would be the conclusion from physics, if all thought processes exist in the physical brain of course.
The physical brain is analog device, similar to a radio or any other electrical device. If you believe some how your brain follows different laws of physics than a radio or other electrical devices then you’re basically saying you don’t believe in science.
Oh dear, your comments are so outrageous and biased I don’t know where to begin. Physics IS the mother science, but I will not worship at its alter until you guys reconcile quantum mechanics and relativity and figure out what dark matter and dark energy are. To imply that you guys also understand the brain better than anybody else is the height of arrogance from a discipline that does not even have its own house in order.
Nowhere do I say that I don’t believe in science or that the brain is not an analog device that operates largely on electrochemical principles. In fact, I have a book coming out this Spring with Springer (“Atoms of Mind”) which contains a novel materialistic theory for how brain represents the physical world, including how it might enhance that representation in consciousness.
I would suggest that the conclusions about “free will” in THEONEWITHOUTASECOND’s post rest
upon the tenets of Reductive Physicalism rather than the particular details of modern
physics’ description of the world.
Whether we are one universe, one of countless parallel “many worlds” universes, or one of
an infinite regress of nested simulated universes, Reductive Physicalism would assert that,
at root, there is a supervening foundational system of self-consistent ‘laws’ describing
existence (even if it is a description of infinite supervening regress – i.e. “its turtles
all the way down”). This assumption is at the foundation of scientific inquiry. I, for
one, find it impossible (paradoxical?) to conceive of a world where this is not the state
of affairs.
Arguments about quantum uncertainty enabling “free will” are fallacious, I believe, for two
reasons. The first is philosophical in nature. While experiments show QM is incompatible
with a local hidden variable hypothesis, it does not, however, rule out non-loacal hidden
variable interpretations. The world may still be fundamentally deterministic and one can
think of plausible scenarios for how this might be (our world is a simulation, etc.), but
these are just conjecture. For the same reasons I can’t conceive of a “non physical” world
, I find it impossible to imagine that things really do “happen for no reason”.
Secondly, even if QM uncertainty is at the root of the system upon which our brains operate
and our minds rest, there is good reason to believe it has no effect whatsoever as the
decoherence time scales are MANY orders of magnitude faster than any recognized processes
influencing a brain’s state of mind [1].
Zooming back, the entire debate about “free will” seems to rest on shaky ground. The
concept of “free will” seems to me an ill defined concept we ‘romantically’ wish were true
for reasons we can’t quite explain. I, for one, view the mind’s perception of “free will”
as an inevitable consequence of our perception of the passage of time. But whether time
really ‘flows’ or we just perceive it to and whether our minds exhibit the far less defined
property of “free will” makes no difference to me. I personally don’t think my mind’s
perceptions of its existence would be enhanced in any way if the decisions it makes happen
for in-principle deterministic (but still unpredictable) reasons or for no supervening
reason at all.
[1] M. Tegmark, Phys. Rev. E 61, 4194
What would you, Dr W.R. Klemm, say about the following situation. If 2 people were exactly the same in genetics and environment, no mutations no differences, would they necessary act in the same manner to a situation or might they choose to act differently?
How about a society completely comprising of exactly the same person? Would they have leaders or would they choose to be indifferent.
Lachlan,
I don’t think you’ve thought this through.
For these twins to act exactly the same then every cell, every neuron, every sodium ion, every atom in their bodies would have to be the same – all the time. And they would have to live in exactly duplicated environments. And they would have to be kept separate, from each other any every other possible divergent influence.
But, even if we allowed the crazy notion that we could create twins exactly to this level of detail, then from that moment on their lives would diverge.
The Brownian motion in the fluids in their heads would immediately start to trigger what to us look like random events. The flow of blood in their blood vessels would be chaotic at the blood cell level, which would have implications for the supply of blood to the brain.
The slightest variation in the movement of molecules within a synapse could determine whether a neuron fires or not. And there are trillions of synapses diverging in their imposition on other neurons.
And then there are all the external influences. As you speak to one twin he’s thinking, “This guy is speaking to me, and not my twin.”, while the other is thinking, “This guy is speaking to my twin and not me. Why?”
But basically your thought experiment doesn’t get off the ground. In order to create two identical humans to start this experiment you would have to ensure there was no divergence during the creation process. Every atom would have to be perfectly stationary – absolute zero – so that it didn’t start activity in one twin that wasn’t happening in another.
Do I need to go on?
Divergence in real twins begins as soon as they are distinct zygotes. And mutation isn’t some strange rare thing. It’s happening all the time, though a lot of it may not have any obvious effect to our eyes.
Thought experiments have to have some semblance of reality, otherwise they are useless fictions.
I don’t understand what you mean by
‘The Brownian motion in the fluids in their heads would immediately start to trigger what to us look like random events.’
Are you suggesting it is not random?
I don’t know. That depends on the extent to which causality pertains – and that’s something we don’t know. It appears to, at least at macro levels. And maybe it doesn’t at sub-atomic levels. This calls into question our understanding of ‘random’.
So, my point was that it ‘appears’ to us to be random, whether it actually is or not.
And in the context of my point, that is sufficient to be a source of diversity between twins.
Your second paragraph is more realistic, as a metaphor for the heat death of the universe. Maximum entropy. All is the same.
The whole question of free will or not is ridiculous. The only thing important is that the free will paradigm is used to efficate ones life — that is explicit awareness of options, choice and outcomes. Implicit thought is that way — even for rats — become aware, weight the options and decide(and do) and assess (RPE) reward prediction error.
Believing deterministically will no doubt determine!! your potential.
Jerry
Hi there. A pleasure to read your blog. I hope you don’t mind dessenting thoughts on the topic.
I think the experiments are evidence that lean toward what we can already logically understand. You are correct that they do not stand fully on their own, but they show the direction that neuroscience is taking for this topic, and I have no doubt your questions will be answered thoroughly scientifically. If the brain processes a causal direction of ones action prior to them realizing that is the action they will take (up to 10 seconds prior), it is at least supporting evidence for a causality that is not reliant on what the person is thinking at the time – for the direction of the choice.
But it is not needed to understand that free will is logically incoherent. What we can understand is that free will, the type that implies responsibility, is logically incompatible in both a deterministic universe (entirely causal) as well as an indeterministic universe (one where acausal events happen).
If the universe is deterministic, our actions are those that are derived from long lines of causation that extend outside of a person. Before we are ever born even.
If the universe is indeterministic, acausal events that happen within it can never be willed events, as that would require a willer…a cause. Such events, if they affected thought, would be even more detrimental to a person. At least with causality there is willing – just not freely so.
It is this hard incompatibilist stance that I take in the book I am currently writing. There is much more to the logic and it is thoroughly detailed out in a way that there is no escaping the conclusion. Free will is logically incoherent; therefore the feeling of it is an illusion. Neuroscience is just beginning to point to what can already be reliably known.
Take care,
‘Trick Slattery
http://www.breakingthefreewillillusion.com
Well, this is a hard problem. When you say “If the brain processes a causal direction of ones action prior to them realizing that is the action they will take (up to 10 seconds prior)….” you honor my main point. IF is a big “if.” My point was that the evidence does not prove this action was directed before conscious realization. I am open to this possibility for simple, reflex-like actions as a button press. To extend that conclusion, assuming that unassailable evidence for it will someday emerge, to more complex human reasoning seems unjustified by these methods.
Your second paragraph is an assertion and not defended with evidence or logic.
Note that the next two paragraphs begin with “IF.” I get confused by all this emphasis on deterministic/indeterministic. Everything, as far as I know, has a cause. Isn’t the issue whether the cause of human choice/decision can every be freely made? Can’t you make a free choice that CAUSES a behavior?
I assume you are saying that a choice can cause things to happen but nothing can cause the choice, if the choice were freely made. I think this misses the point that neural processes can cause choices and that after the brain integrates the options (IN CONSCIOUS awareness), it decides on one option based on evaluation of the usefulness of the probable outcomes. Why isn’t that “free will” if it is done consciously?
Maybe the real problem here is semantics, that is, the definition of free will.
Help me out here.
“My point was that the evidence does not prove this action was directed before conscious realization.”
And mine was that it leans toward that direction. Again, I agree it does not stand on it’s own as a sole proof, but it is evidence that at least for button presses it is the case, and there is no reason to conclude that complexity would be different. It is supporting evidence in which there is none that currently goes against it for different actions.
“Everything, as far as I know, has a cause. ”
Then you believe in a deterministic universe (an entirely causal universe). Whether that is the case or not we cannot know. IF it is deterministic, my assertion, which I did not delve into at length, is supported by numerous chapters of logic in my book. I can only provide the basics based on your response in a comment box.
Lets start with this statement and question:
“I think this misses the point that neural processes can cause choices and that after the brain integrates the options (IN CONSCIOUS awareness), it decides on one option based on evaluation of the usefulness of the probable outcomes. Why isn’t that “free will” if it is done consciously?”
Even if this were the case, something causes the brain to integrate those very options (whether consciously or unconsciously), and whatever does, has a cause of its own, which has a cause of its own, which has a cause of its own…down to a point of no conscious awareness. If every event has a cause, this leads down a path of antecedent causes that eventually take place outside of the person (again, even before they are born). Such choice is entirely dictated by genetics and environmental causes outside of the control of the person making the decision. Such decisions are not free because they had to come about. There was no possible way to select one of those other options based on the antecedent events. Those other options were never viable. They were only part of the causality that lead to the only possible option. For something to be free (in the sense that implies responsibility), it has to have the ability to have done differently.
As for the definition of free will, the only one that concerns me is the one that implies responsibility, because it is that type that is illogical. I define free will as “The ability to choose between more that one viable option or action in which that choice is up to the chooser”. It is this definition (or something of that sort) I think people think they have intuitively, and it is this definition that injects responsibility.
Take care,
‘Trick Slattery
I think you are getting to the point when you consider the ‘definition’ of free-will, for the purposes of responsibility and accountability.
When a rock falls from a cliff and injures someone below we can say, by definition, that the rock is responsible for the injury; but we mean it in an innanimate sense. We say the falling rock ’caused’ the injury, but it being innanimate we don’t find much use in ‘blaming’ rock, punishing it or otherwise seeking retribution.
The unfortunate coincidence of all events that brought the injured person to the spot at that time, their ‘free-will’, is somehow not responsible in an active sense. On the other hand, if there were signs present that warned of the dangers of walking near the cliff then perhaps we would then say they were responsible.
In the case of some complex but otherwise ‘non-living’ objects, we do get a little mixed up about this. We are often quite willing to attribute blame and seek retribution from computers or cars, for example.
It’s no coincidence that in business the ‘corporation’ is viewed as an agent entity in its own right, apart from the people who own it or work in it.
The attribution of blame and responsibility seems to be a behaviour in the brains of human observers and participants in events. It’s almost as if our attachment to causaility makes us attribute specific causaility – i.e. blame and responsibility – to objects. Where those objects appear more complex and animate, where attribute agency, where the complexity of the causal chains is predominantly internal to the agent and unfathomable in detail to the observers, we seem to have the need to invent, to define, ‘free-will’.
Note also that those who judge other people for wrong-doing, those who attribute responsibility and blame, who seek retribution, well, they too are behaving in the same causal world, and they too are just as responsible, or not, for their actions, their judgementalism, as the person they are judging.
In other words, those of us who support a system that imprisons ‘wrong-doers’ lack free-will in this as much as the wrong-doers lack free-will in their wrong-doing. It still remains a level playing field.
This view that there is no real free-will does not suddenly mean we start absolving wrong-doers of responsibility. It merely means we rethink the meaning of these words. It’s also a more compasionate view of the world, because we recognise that we too are at the mercy of causal events just as any wrong-doer is – we are just fortunate enough to have avoided any significant wrong-doing. We may be tempted to pat ourselves on the back for that, because we are morally good. But perhaps we should be a bit more humble than that.
The ‘free-will’ view is a little too convenient when it comes to attributing blame and seeking retribution and even revenge. Religion has made the free-will model of human behaviour more significant that it warrants.
Excellent comments. Just to add a few thought to them:
Not being responsible does not mean that people should not be incarcerated, rehabilitated, or deterred. It just means that they should not be punished for retributive reasons and that they are not deserving of such. We need to remove the construct of retributivism in our thinking and within our criminal system, and replace it with one that is about the utility of society.
If we did not incarcerate criminals, for example, we cause harms to victims for lack of such preventative actions. Victims that equally do not deserve to be victimized. Just as we might prevent or put down a rabid dog before it bites people, without assigning it “free will”, there are actions that need to happen for the sake of others.
Also, we need to consider that people are not more deserving than others. The psychology that the free will illusion creates is one that is egocentric and creates much harms in the world.
Thanks,
‘Trick Slattery
Re: latest comments from RONMURP and Trick:
Both of you are arguing the free-will illusion position from sociological perspectives. Where is the scientific evidence that it is an illusion?
I don’t think you read my original paper in Arch. Cognitive Psychology. I (and the peer reviewers)thought I had pretty well demolished what you call the evidence for illusory free will. Those experiments and their interpretation are flawed, even for a simple action like a button press.
Philosophical arguments seem to dominate the conversation. Where is the science?
Hi – thanks for the response.
I have only read this blog post and not your original paper, so I am only responding to that. I am familiar with the original study, however, so I honestly cannot fathom how you conclude its flawed-ness for a button press, but again, I have not read your original paper so cannot judge on that, only on the points you made in this blog post. I will take the time to read your original paper.
My own arguments are from the logical and philosophical perspective. Certainly we cannot scientifically derive that square circles in another galaxy do not exist, but such a belief in such is illogical (contradictory) even if we felt they exist. Free will is an illusion because it is logically incompatible with the only two possibilities for events (events being causal or events being acausal).
In regards to the “science”, certainly you are not suggesting that the burden of proof is on the person claiming something does not exist? The feeling of free will is not scientific proof of free will’s existence, it is scientific proof of the feeling of free will.
If your epistemological stance is one that only allows for the inductive scientific method…for the free will exists stance I have one question. Where is the science?
Take care,
‘Trick
I agree with Trick’s post… it is up to you to prove the existence of free will if you want to assert its existence.
Hi Bill,
I agree that the specific evidence is tenuous (i.e. the degree to which that evidence supports to any illusory free-will). The trouble is that any evidence (is there any?) that supports actual free-will in any meaningful sense is also lacking. So, where do we go from there?
All the evidence from all aspects if physics down to quantum stuff, while not specifically refuting free-will, does not support it in any way.
If anything the inductive working conclusion, or at least the working hypothesis, is that there is nothing beyond what physics shows us, that the whole of reality is unified at some fundamental level – i.e. it’s our best effort at a representation of reality. Unless we have a very good reason to reject determinism then there is nothing that supports the common notion of free-will.
Free-will, if it exists as commonly understood, is a fundamentally different thing than we find anywhere else or in anything else other than brains – so the parsimonious hypothesis is that what we think of as free-will is a misunderstanding on our part. This makes sense since we often find that the brain gets things quite wrong. We can readily experience illusions that we acknowledge are illusions; what’s so tough about this one?
When we factor in what we know about evolution, that we basically arrive where we are now from simpler beginnings, there seems to be nothing in evolution (and evolution conforms to physics) that tells us when this magical free-will is suddenly injected or when or how it emerges. Much more likely that it’s an ‘apparent’ or illusory thing that is merely a behavioural artifact of one particular complex species that can’t get a firm enough handle on the complexity and chaotic nature of its own brain to see the detailed determinism that is driving it.
Can you point me to any source that you think positively supports free-will?
Good, now we can both agree that the scientific evidence for or against “free will” is inadequate. There remain two other problems:
1. Definition of free will (we all define it operationally in different ways)
2. Quantum physics: there is no compelling evidence I know of that quantum mechanics operates beyond the atomic level of organization. To apply it to consciousness, free will, and mental functions in general seems inappropriate.
Bill
Bill,
I disagree with your point # 2. Quantum physics, assuming that randomness at an atomic level exists, does lead to randomness and differences at higher levels. You can think of this as the butterfly effect. If even one atom is in a different place, the course of events in time will change. How noticeable that change is — is pure speculation — but a difference is assumed nevertheless. With regard to free will, randomness implies that even if we defined a “willed” action to be a result of consistence adequate determinism, if there is a random foundation (i.e. quantum physics), then the macro-result stems from this randomness and thus is out of our control. This would apply to brain activity, structure, sense perception — everything. So it is perfectly reasonable to mention it when it comes to discussing a concept as far reaching as “free will”. If we had unconscious motivations to do something, but due to quantum randomness, this motivation underwent a random change to something else, even if only slightly different, it would have ramifications on your conscious mind, etc.
Peace and love,
-Lage
Hi Bill,
It’s worth pointing out that this blog post makes a specific emphatic claim, “Free Will is NOT An Illusion”. This is a positive claim, and I think most commentors here are addressing that claim. Not only is there not evidence to support this claim, but what little evidence there is about the brain/mind, along with all other knowledge about physics, and philosophical views about what is not yet known, all point, most parsimoniously, to free-will being an illusion.
But it’s necessary to say that these objections to there being free-will depend very much on what we all think free-will actually is. Most of those that think it is an illusion are talking about the common notion of free-will, whereby an agent can make a decision through some obscure volition or intent that they are supposed to possess. But this notion is really flaky, and I’ve yet to see a definition that distinguishes it from what amounts to decision-making.
The problem with decision-making is that it is not restricted to the common notion of free-will – i.e. common notion free-will is not required for decision-making. In your paper you invoke notions of decision-making being dispersed over location in the brain, and time – and you use this to build objections to some of the experiments you cover.
But my fridge makes decisions in this sense. It’s decision-making involves various sensing and motor activities in order to achieve a goal – to keep its inner temperature at some setting. Hysteresis and general timing delays in the system also demonstrate that the decision making is spread over time.
You acknowledge the difficulty of attributing various discrete observations of brain activity to evidence for lack of free-will, but subtly imply that they support the notion of free-will by default – and sometimes you go further than merely implying it.
Some specific responses to this post follow:
1) “Many scientists think that free-will is an illusion.” – OK
2) “That is, intentions, choices, and decisions are made by subconscious mind, which only lets the conscious mind know what was willed after the fact.” – This is a misrepresentation of (1) This is certainly not the reason for accepting (1), though some think it contributes to the acceptance of (1).
3) “Many modern scientists also hold that position and have even performed experiments since the 1980s they say prove it.” – This seems a little vague. I agree that they claim that their experiments prove sometimes subconscious decision precede conscious awareness – but this isn’t objectionable since you also agree with that view, though in a larger context where you think prior free-will decisions cause the subconscious actions in the first place (e.g. typing example). What the experiments don’t do, and I’m not aware that the experimenters do claim they do, is that they prove (1).
4) “These experiments do not test what they are intended to test and are misinterpreted to support the view of illusory free will.” – While I’m not sure about the first part, I would agree with the second part that I’ve emphasised.
I agree partly with your twelve points as expressed in this blog post, though I’d respond differently to them when considering how you present them in your paper. But for now my main criticism of some specific ones is as follows:
There’s a great presupposition of free-will on your part, and this goes right through your paper. “Some willed action, as when first learning to play a musical instrument or touch type (a)must be freely willed because (b)the subconscious mind cannot know ahead of time what to do.”
(a) Why? Learning to type requires specific detailed actions that become smoother and are left to less conscious brain activity. This does not necessarily imply free-will when first learning – either in the decision to learn, or in the micro-decisions that are necessary to actively learn.
(b) Why not? It seems clear that the subconscious mind is in play all the time. What prior experiences are at work automating the drive of the subconscious, and to what extent is the seemingly conscious mind falling in with this overall automated drive?
What appears to be happening here with your approach is that you are using the same ploy that you object to elswhere. You are objecting to the boundaries of some of the experiments you criticise, in that you claim they don’t look at enough areas of the brain or over sufficient time; and yet here you seem to think that the decision to learn an instrument is a stand-alone free-will act, when it too will have been influenced by many external and internal factors – not least the experience of seeing someone else play and ‘inspiring’ you to learn; the experience of being inspired to do something seems an equally inexplicable drive.
The complexity of this and many more influences, and the impact of empathetic features of the brain, such as the mirror neurons, all points to this being a far more complex ‘decision’ than you allow. There are many ways in which the decision to learn to play an instrument can be interpreted as far from a free-will decision. Again there is a distinction between an entity (a free-will agent or an automata or zombie) making a decision and the possession of commonly understood free-will.
“Extrapolating from such simple experiments to all mental life is not justified.” – Agreed. But neither is extrapolation from your experiments to free-will justified, for the very same reasons. And nor is the interpolation, the ‘free-will of the gaps’ move, justified.
“…the research I suggest would not only help identify reliable markers of conscious decision-making.” – That may well be the case, and such experiments would be welcomed. But identifying decision markers of conscious decision-making isn’t identifying free-will – at least not the common view of free-will.
I don’t think any of the illusory free-will proponents really object to there being ‘conscious decision-making’ going on in the brain. The real question that blog addresses in its heading is something quite different – free-will. Many illusory free-will proponents accept that the conscious aspect of the brain is some sort of planning and decision making system. So the real question is what drives that system acquire its goals, to which it then applies planning and decision making? If you want to insist that this is free-will, then you need to explain more of the magic of free-will – what really is it?
Neither in this blog post nor in your paper do your really address what you mean by free-will – or at least the free-will that isn’t illusory. In places in your paper you seem to conflate free-will with decision making. In those parts you seem to be aligned with what many illusory free-will proponents think about decision making systems, so maybe there’s lots of overlap.
In your paper, and in a comment above, you point out the reliance on determinism for the illusory free-will view. I agree. And you too rely on that when performing experiments that supposedly support a notion of free-will.
I summary, I can see your point about some of the experiments being used to claim too much for illusory free-will, but I can’t see anything that supports free-will, or even explains what it is. I see plenty of unjustified conflation of free-will and decision-making, when decision-making isn’t restricted to the common notion of free-will. I can see how illusory free-will (and physicalism generally) requires determinism, but can’t see an alternative to determinism that works at all, or any that supports free-will.
So, the questions remain:
1) What precisely is this magic that is free-will? Do you really mean decision-making? If so, I’m not sure what significant difference there is between you and I on this issue.
2) How does your notion of free-will come about, from any perspective: physics, biology, evolution?
3) How precisely do any experiments support the notion of free-will?
4) If you want to object to determinism, what do you have in its place, and how does that make your experiments support free-will?
Without good hypotheses that cover all these the parsimonious view is that the brain works like everything else we know about the world. It’s an extremely complex mushy, determinate system.
Hey guys, I cannot really contribute on this subject. But I really enjoy this conversation and want you to encourage to continue.
I also have one question for the contra free will site.
How do you live with knowing that you are just tricked by your brain/physics and not an acting participant of the world.
Sincerely
Hi Moe,
How do you live with knowing that you are just tricked by your brain/physics and you’re not a solid object but mostly empty space with a few atoms dotted around here and there? How do live with the fact that you are mostly water?
I don’t worry that I probably don’t have the free-will I appear to have, any more than I worry that I’m not as solid as I appear to be. There are lots of other details about human biology that many people find odd when they first discover it. The concept of human evolution is disturbing to some people – “What? We’re animals? No! God made us above the animals.”.
All these realities that we discover, or our interpretations of reality, don’t have to have any impact on our personal or social life – though they may, depending on one’s outlook. Many people feel freer when they get the picture of illusory free-will. Not in the sense that it absolves one of any and all responsibility; but in the sense that it puts a lot of human behaviour that’s difficult to understand under the free-will model (particularly the one attached to religion) into a much clearer perspective.
It doesn’t excuse behaviour in any way, but simply explains it from another angle. And in explaining it that way it produces a more empathetic outlook. It doesn’t mean we stop locking up criminals immediately, but it does mean we have a different outlook on what criminal behaviour is. It removes artificial and often contradictory moral constraints – why is cannabis illegal, but alcohol isn’t? Ethics becomes a pragmatic subject rather than a moral crusade.
I’m not a Buddhist, but it appears that there are some parallels with some aspects of Buddhist philosophy. It has an element of fatalism too it, though not the “I can’t change anything, so what’s the point?” tragic fatalism that opponents often think is the case. More a “Shit happens!” outlook. Shit happens, but this automaton entity still has to deal with it occasionally, and isn’t averse to making decisions, no matter how automated they are, or how ‘free’ they feel, to alleviate the quantity of shit coming its way.
This isn’t entirely off-topic, since Bill addresses issues like this in his paper. A common mistake seems to be the thinking that illusory free-will proponents dissolve into nihilism: from Bill’s paper, “…the philosopher, Patricia Churchland (2002), and the neuroscientist, Michael Gazzaniga (1998), recognize the nihilistic nature of the zombian conclusion but are resigned to a position of “it must be so.” ” – It’s not nihilistic (Total rejection of established laws and institutions. Anarchy, terrorism, or other revolutionary activity. Total and absolute destructiveness, especially toward the world at large and including oneself.) The view that it is nihilistic is typically a failure of imagination on the part of those that feel they need free-will – they can’t imagine what it’s like to reject it as a view of what’s actually happening in brains.
An important distinction again is that of free-will and decision-making. I don’t think you’ll find any modern mainstream philosopher or scientist who thinks free-will is illusory also thinks the human brain does not make conscious decisions. The question is what those decision making processes consist of, how they come about, what drives them – they simply think that it’s not some magical free-will.
I may be an automaton. But I’m such a complex one that no matter how deterministic the world is, philosophically or in physical reality, to me the world and I remain indeterminate because of that complexity. Rather than worry about which long term sequence of complex and parallel events throughout my life guided me to this point in time to respond to you, it’s more convenient to come up with a story: I’m interested in the brain, and Bill’s article intrigued me, and your question prompted me to respond – or even more succinctly, I ‘decided’ to respond. So, am I a passive automated respondent, or am I an active agent responding out of free-will, and how do you tell the difference?
I have been avoiding the topic of religion, but since you bring it up, let’s pursue that. You say, “Many people feel freer when they get the picture of illusory free-will. Not in the sense that it absolves one of any and all responsibility; but in the sense that it puts a lot of human behaviour that’s difficult to understand under the free-will model (particularly the one attached to religion) into a much clearer perspective.”
How can one feel “freer” believing that God arbitrarily and capriciously programs your brain to control all your beliefs, choices, and behavior? I used to be a Presbyterian, until I discovered that many of them really believe in a Predestination in which God decided before you were born how you will turn out and spend eternity.
While we are on the subject, consider the very radical transformation some people exhibit when they are suddenly “saved.” I suppose you would say God did that to his robot. The whole thrust of the teaching of Jesus Christ is that belief is something you are free to choose or reject.
Hi Bill,
I don’t believe “that God arbitrarily and capriciously programs your brain to control all your beliefs, choices, and behaviour?” I’m an atheist.
I think the brain is programmed by a genetic and developmental history that brings to the point where it begins to develop in the fetus, and from there on in continues to be programmed by direct personal sensory experience, with lots of very complex internal feedback, to the extent that, as I say, to us the state of any brain at any instant is practicably indeterminate (whether the larger universe is determinate or not). Its complex decision making processes, of which there appear to be many parallel components not at all well understood, click away working toward many and various overall goals that the brain/body system, the person, has acquired and continues to acquire and adapt to. There seems no need to invoke a free-will model, and I still can’t see how a free-will model is justified.
My point about free-will and (Abrahamic) religion is that the religious tend to have a need for free-will, to the extent that it’s a necessary requirement from a religious perspective. God is required to give us free-will to explain how an omni benevolent God justifies all the suffering in the world; and it’s a good excuse to apportion blame and seek retribution.
The predestination model in a religious context is no better than a free-will one. In both cases God is supposed to have willed it without us having any say in the matter – sans any evidence for a God whatsoever.
“The whole thrust of the teaching of Jesus Christ is that belief is something you are free to choose or reject.” – Jesus was a man who lived about 2000 years ago. And he was a Jew. He may have been a great and novel preacher. But his view of what free-will is was obviously coloured by his religious views and the metaphysics of his age. He didn’t have a further two millenia of philosophy and a few hundred years of science to inform his opinions. We’re a bit luckier than that.
There is of course the possibility of thinking there is free-will without God. But then this looks like unexplained magic, as opposed to the supernatural magic from God.
But I don’t want to side-track us too much. I didn’t mean my recent comments to be an atheist rant – I was merely responding to Moe. I’m much more interested in the main topic of free-will, and in your response to my other comments on your main post and paper – basically how you support the view that there is free-will, and what you mean by free-will anyway.
So, your comment on one of the problems, at July 22, 2011 at 8:31 am: “1. Definition of free will (we all define it operationally in different ways)” – Can you explain what your definition is so I can get a handle on what you mean by your title, “Free Will is NOT An Illusion”.
Ron:
You asked how I define free will. First you might be interested in the variety of definitions people have used. The first five I came across are:
1. the ability to act or make choices as a free and autonomous being and not solely as a result of compulsion or predestination
2. The ability or discretion to choose; free choice: chose to remain behind of my own free will.
3. The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.
4. Free will is the apparent ability of agents to make choices free from deterministic influences.(Determinism is the general philosophical thesis that states that for everything that happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could happen.)
5. the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces.
My definition accommodates most of these positions:
Free will is a conscious intent, decision, or choice
that is not pre-determined.
As for your comments on Jesus, I think you missed the point. His teachings transcend history, cultural “advancement,” and even science. His central message is only obscured by intellectual nuance:
1. There is a creator God (who created the laws of chemistry and physics that underlie everything in the known universe)
2. This God loves His creation and wants to save us from our sins, defined as anything that we willfully do to harm ourselves or others.
3. Belief in Jesus provides the way for sinful humans to become reconciled to a Holy God.
These core ideas have been muddled by the many lightweight religious thinkers over the centuries (Paul, Augustine, and Aquinas are notable exceptions). A major part of the confusion as regards free will is the view of “fallenness,” that we inevitably sin because of our animal nature. Jesus asserted just the opposite; namely, that we are free to choose righteousness (exemplified by his comment to the whore, “go and sin no more.”
At this point you might be tempted to say “aha, you are hoisted on your own pitard!” We are animals and therefore cannot help but sin. But righteousness does not mean perfection. Christ does give us the power to sin LESS. Consider the example of Nixon’s hatchet man, Chuck Colson, who since his conversion has for decades been a tireless advocate for Jesus in his prison ministries and has helped thousands of very sinful people CHOOSE to become less sinful.
If there is no free what and no God to make you do it, what pre-determined you to become an atheist? Why are you unable to change (as Colson and thousands upon thousands of others have)?
We have not talked much about probability. You are perhaps more LIKELY to be an atheist and I a Christian. Though the odds of choosing the alternative are low, they are not zero. We can still be one or the other.
Bill
Thank you for your answer Ronmurp.
Hi Bill,
On free-will…
So it appears your view of free-will is really a predominantly religious one, or philosophical one influenced by your religious views. But I might remind you of one of your comments: “Philosophical arguments seem to dominate the conversation. Where is the science?” So surely a religious imperative isn’t science.
Some of these definitions remain vague and don’t really address the issues that make any kind of free-will distinct from decision making, which automatons can perform.
“1. the ability to act or make choices as a free and autonomous being and not solely as a result of compulsion or predestination”
- “the ability to act” – Automatons can act.
- “as a free…” – This is making the definition circular? What is it be ‘free’ in this context?
- “…and autonomous” – An automaton can satisfy that again.
- “a…being” – In this context it really means an organic entity, or specifically a human. But there’s nothing inherent in ‘a being’ that means it has free-will in the spooky sense.
- “not solely as a result of compulsion” – If the deterministic entity is complex enough then the many influences that ‘compel’ the entity to act may make it appear as being more free than it is (i.e. illusory). A fridge thermostat looks less free than Honda’s ASIMO robot, but both are compelled to act by physics, no matter how relatively autonomous each may be.
- “or predestination” – This has religious overtones, but ignoring the religious aspect it merely means deterministic.
“2. The ability or discretion to choose; free choice: chose to remain behind of my own free will.”
- “The ability or discretion to choose” – My fridge has that, with regard to controlling temperature.
- “free choice” – In what context? My fridge has the free-choice to set my fridge temperature anywhere within the limits determined by it’s environment. I may ask it to set the temperature to 3-deg C, but it might ‘choose’ to set it to 3+/- 10%. Is this a choice you might ask? Well, can I choose to jump a 30ft gap? We are all constrained to various degrees, but just because a human brain has room for movement within a complex set of constraints does not mean it has ‘free-will’.
- “chose to remain behind of my own free will” – Not sure what that means.
“3. The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.”
- “unconstrained by external circumstances” – Nothing I know of has that ‘freedom’. Examples?
- “unconstrained by…agency such as fate” – I didn’t know fate was an agency?
- “unconstrained by…agency such as …divine will” – Since there’s no evidence for any divine will I’d agree that there’s therefore no evidence that our ‘free-will’ (our autonomous decision-making) is constrained by it.
“4. Free will is the apparent ability of agents to make choices free from deterministic influences.”
This looks like the closest definition to the common understanding of free-will, in that it specifically opposes determinism. But I agree, it is an ‘apparent’ ability to make ‘free’ choices.
But it it’s not merely apparent (illusory) then the definition doesn’t go on to say how that comes about, and that’s one of the questions I wanted to put to you. I don’t think it is apparent that we can make choices free from deterministic influences. That’s the whole point of free-will being an illusion.
“Determinism is the general philosophical thesis that states that for everything that happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could happen.” – That’s the general idea that under pins all of science. As I said in an earlier comment, it would take the refutation of determinism to make a space for ‘free-will’ independent of determinism so that it could be considered seriously. I realise that’s a tough call, because how do you in fact provide evidence that there’s no determinism when the way we deal with evidence relies on determinism? When we’ve figured that out then maybe we can come back to free-will, but until then free-will seems to be out of the picture.
“5. The doctrine…” – Nothing new here. Personal choice in this context is just a metaphor for free-will.
“Free will is a conscious intent, decision, or choice that is not pre-determined.”
So, where’s the science? What backs up this up? How have you refuted determinism somewhere without me noticing?
On Jesus and religion…
“His teachings transcend history…and even science…”
I think you miss the point. He was a guy who lived a couple of thousand years ago. His teachings were only ever either social or religious. Some of his social teachings were great, really cool ideas for his time. But then not much different from many other philosopher prophets. The religious context in which he posed them is arcane. I’m not sure what you even mean by ‘transcends…even science’
“1. There is a creator God…” – really? Again, where is the science?
“2. This God loves His creation…” – really? With no evidence for (1), how can you be sure. How to religious adherents know this stuff about this creator?
“3. Belief in Jesus provides the way for sinful humans to become reconciled to a Holy God.”
So much packed into this one…
Belief in Jesus is the just a belief, and being involved in brain science I’m sure you’re aware that what we believe isn’t always so. What’s behind this is clearly a compulsion to believe despite lack of evidence. “Science is the best defense against believing what we want to.” – Ian Stewart (mathematician).
“Sinful humans” – Sin has context only in a religious framework in which some acts are given that label. Out of that context sin has no useful meaning. And, outside the context of our particular evolution it’s arbitrary.
For example, we might label infanticide a ‘sin’. But suppose our recent evolutionary history had included the tendency for males to kill the existing young of a new mate, as lions kill cubs from a previous male. Then now it might be socially acceptable when marrying a divorced woman to kill her children from a previous marriage. Sure, we might have adapted this practice, from killing to merely expelling – and that does actually happen in plenty of cases, where teens from previous marriages are driven to leave when the mother takes a new spouse. And if infanticide seems outrageous, then what of the Islamic requirement to kill apostates.
Sin, in the context of the wider universe, and even within the context of most animals, is an entirely meaningless concept. Only we humans label some acts we don’t like as sinful. And since our evolution is arbitrary, then so are many of our concepts taken out of that human context.
“These core ideas have been muddled …” – These core ideas remain muddled by religious thinking. Where’s the science?
“A major part of the confusion as regards free will is the view of ‘fallenness’…” – Again, that’s an entirely religious context and puts only an alternative slant on the more general notion of free-will, which is aligned with Cartesian dualism, that there is something, a soul, a mind, that is free of the material body in some way. Where’s the science.
“Jesus asserted…” – Then it’s just an assertion.
“At this point you might be tempted to say “aha, you are hoisted on your own pitard!” We are animals and therefore cannot help but sin.” – No I’m not tempted to say that at all. We are animals, yes. But the sin bit is quite meaningless beyond any fiction a religious view might attach to it.
“…Chuck Colson…” – Is all this tells me is that a man has changed his behaviour. It may well have been his belief in God that contributed to that change. He might well have changed in a similar way had a Muslim or a Scientologist convinced him to their persuasion. Put a person with his background in his environment then he, as an automaton, is susceptible to change. And, in then going on to persuade others about the power of Jesus he is then influencing them, limiting their ‘free-will’, constraining their environment to one that converts them to Christianity. It’s no surprise that one’s religion is determined by the community in which one is raised, or if you come to religion later, by the one that persuades you, the one that influences your brain to believe that stuff.
Chuck Colson may well have made decisions. But to what extent they are what is commonly understood as free-will is an entirely different matter. Anecdotes about ‘saved’ Christians aren’t convincing, since they are just as compatible with illusory free-will. If anything I’m persuaded that people come to believe unsubstantiated religious stuff so easily that compelling a human automaton to believe anything is a matter of indoctrination.
“If there is no free what and no God to make you do it, what pre-determined you to become an atheist?”
My own personal development and influences that programmed me, along with the machinations of my own material brain ticking away as it does. Don’t get me wrong. I’m not pleading that atheists are special in some way or different in any inherent way to religious believers. We have just been exposed to philosophy and science that has convinced our brains that this is the right view. In the larger scheme of things, to the wider universe, we are just specks of complex dynamic matter that forms minor blips in the overall expansion and heat death of the universe.
Now a religious perspective might see some grand divine being sitting outside all that, but those very thoughts, those religious beliefs, do not appear to correspond to any known reality outside the heads of those few billion people that believe it – in other words, everything ever thought of about God or gods is nothing more than patterns of activity inside some of those specks. Religious belief really is insignificant, as is all human thought on a cosmic scale. The only way it has any significance is that which we make of it for ourselves. So, we can carry on trying to understand ourselves and the universe we live in, or we can make up fantastic stories about it all and convince ourselves they are important. We treat most stories of fairies, monsters and gods as fictions to enjoy. It seems the only ones who use those fictions to determine how they live their lives are the religious; and the odd young man who takes violent gaming to heart and shoots up a school.
“Why are you unable to change…?”
I am able to change. I was indoctrinated into religion as a child, but changed over time. My opinion changes to some extent every time I learn something. If enough persuasive data comes my way that hits the right triggers in my brain my mind will be changed for me, no matter how I think I might be able to resist. This seems a far better explanation for what actually happens, as believers become unbelievers and non-believers are persuaded to believe.
In trying to convince you of my point of view there need be no free-will on my part. I’m compelled to interact with you this way by the many complex triggers that are driving me. We often acknowledge how we are driven away from what we think are our concerted efforts – we can be distracted, and even speak of how we lack free-will in that respect. But then when someone has an obvious compulsive habit we also say they have no free-will to resist it. Yet in this in-between state, where we muddle along, trying to achieve some specific goals, occasionally abandoning them for different ones, but in most respects being averagely driven by impulses, we think in such a state the magic that is free-will is up and running? I don’t think so.
Persuade me. Where’s the science that even hints at there being free-will?
“We have not talked much about probability….”
We can if you wish. What do you think it has to contribute to the free-will issue?
Ron et al.
I’m sorry, I have grown weary of this discussion. I don’t think reason can resolve the issues. Some things may just not be knowable.
Bill
There are attempts to demonstrate a biological concept of free will where truly innovative ideas and actions can be taken by humans and some class of animals. This requires a combination of determinism of indeterminism which is thought that may be exploited by evolution in animal’s brains. Some supporters of this ideas are Martin Heisenberg, Bob Doyle and Björn Brembs. Look for this article (maybe you already know it):
http://brembs.net/spontaneous/freewill/procroysoc_2010/
The article is named “Towards a scientific concept of free will as a biological trait: spontaneous actions and decision-making in invertebrates”
It has been shown that not only quantum mechanics, but also Newtonian mechanics may accept indeterminism as John Norton and have been trying to show. The idea of Causation, even though is useful, may not be fundamental to science (John Norton’s Causation as Folk Science).
Some may argue that the idea that the brain having the “exact” combination of determinism with indeterminism is highly improbable. But isn’t life itself an improbable phenomenon?
Sorry about some grammar mistakes in the penultimate paragraph…
Hi Bruno,
Thanks for the link to Björn Brembs’ paper. I’ve commented on it here. I’m not convinced it refutes determinism the way it claims, but in all other respects a good paper with lots of good refs. Thanks.
Hi Bill,
OK, thanks for engaging.
My knowledge of science and physics is very, very weak: but what I have read about physics points to the most likely reality being casually deterministic. To even consider free will as a reality we would have to make a human centric assumption that human beings and their brains act differently than all other material in the universe. All arguments in favor of free will seem very weak to me, and point to a strong bias for free will’s reality on the part of the author, rather than proof and evidence.
Ultimately whether we believe in free will or not is irrelevant to its correctness. And, at least at this point of time, most people do not seem willing to consider free will as illusory. It fits better with their religious and moral beliefs if there is a clear & objective difference between right and wrong actions, and good and evil people. As simple and scientifically supported as determinism is, most people find it too large a paradigm shift to consider.
“As simple and scientifically supported as determinism is, most people find it too large a paradigm shift to consider.”
Hey dude, I think you are thinking like a 19th century person, when the universe was seen as a clockwork-deterministic universe. Nowadays it has been proven by physicists that not even Newtonian mechanics are always deterministic (look for John Norton).
And not to say about quantum mechanics (which is not a deterministic theory). The role of quantum effects on life processes have been turned to be essential. For example in photosynthesis, quantum coherence seems to play a key role. Can you imagine life without photosynthesis???? I suggest to you to reconsider if nowadays physics can be considered as deterministic. I think determinism is just a philosophical issue, just as idealism or other old philosophical postures.
J_G,
I don’t think it’s a clear as you make out, and that it still remains a philosophical issue. See the varieties of determinism here, where Hawkins makes a case for ‘adequate determinism’. I think you’ll find some physicists are ok with that, while others might think the case against determinism isn’t demostrated by quantum mechanics, or at least are non-comittal.
A more significant point is that at the level of brain chemistry and brain cells there is adequate determinism, so that the ontological case any particular cell event determines, or contributes to the function of that cell, and in total those cells determine the function of the brain as a whole and the consequent behaviour of the entity that has the brain.
In contrast to the ontological question is the epistemological one – to what extent can any system fully know itself or its internal operation in order to be said to have real free-will. Introspection tells us nothing about what’s really happening in the brain, so just because we feel we have free will doen’t mean we have. To us as individuals our inner brain function is indeterminate, so we cannot be sure we have free-will.
And this epistemological problem can be applied to fundamental physics. We don’t really know enough to rule out determinism. When particles pop in and out of existence there may be an as yet unknown phenomenon that provides a causal explanation for this. What appears random to us may not be. I’m not sure we fully understand what ‘random’ means, other than being unable to determine (epistemologically) what some ultimate cause might be.
Do you require determinism in order to be certain, to determine, that non-determinism pertains? If non-determinism is the case how do the quantum experiments ‘determine’ this? So is ontological determinism required to be epistemically certain that there is no ontological determinism?
Even if you allow for non-determinism at some fundamental level of reality it does not make the case for real free-will.
Most arguments for free-will tend to be clouded by people with biases that really don’t like the idea that humans do not have real free-will. The bias may be heavily influenced by some personal fear of lack of control, or by some dogmatic philosophical or religious stance. It seems we don’t like the idea that all our actions are determined by external events and internal events that we do not control.
The obvious alternate conclusion is that they do not understand decision making and how it comes to happen in the brain.
There’s nothing to support the conclusion this experiment actually measures anything.
I have a question about the free will (about his relation with neuroscience).Perhaps Dr.Klemm could answer me.
i´ve heard of a neurological disorder called “The alien hand syndrome” in which a person seems to have no conscious control of his own hand.
As far as i know the person thinks consciously “i will move the chair with my left hand” but the left hand not obey that instruction.
This doesn´t support the view of daniel wegner when he says that the “free will is an illusion”?
As I understand it, alien hand syndrome and its related condition of “anarchic” hand, are abnormal states in which one hand is not consciously controlled. That is, free will is certainly not operative regarding this hand. While these abnormal states show that subconscious mind can make the body do things, we already know that. But the lack of control in the alien hand highlights the fact that there IS conscious control over the other hand. At a minimum, control over the good hand and that of the alien hand must be qualitatively different even though the person is conscious throughout. The most parsimonious explanation for that difference is that conscious control can exercise a degree of free will over the good hand and is blocked by the neurological abnormality from expressing control over the alien hand.
Bill,
I agree with your distinction between subconscious and conscious control, so that ‘alien hand’ is not a challenge to free-will.
Conscious control is not necessarily free-will. If the conscious decision is itself controlled, caused, determined, by prior brain states then in what sense is it ‘free’ of physical causal precursors?
I think that the word “free will” can have 2 meanings
Classical free will:the ability of agents to make choices free from certain kinds of constraints (of course this is not true,every action has caused by prior events,you don’t need to be very smart to know these things)
Neuroscientific free will:The ability to initiate or stop voluntarily actions or thoughts without total control of the unconscious processes, (This is the one who worries me)
so leaving aside the issue of “deterministic world”
i would like to know if conscious processes play a causal role in our actions, or else we are slaves to our unconscious?
thanks!!
Alexis,
Do you think we live in a causal universe, with cause and effect? I suppose you do because without that any notion of ‘will’, ‘intention’ is meaningless: the ‘will’ is unable to bring about the effects it is suppose to cause. So, for example, to say “I decide to raise my arm. There, I raised it; I will it.” would not make sense.
We rely on causality to suppose our ‘will’ consciously causes our motor neurons to fire, resulting in bodily motion.
Cause and effect are such that the effect is determined by the cause (or causes) that cause it. There are causes that can, in principle, be identified, and those that seem to have an unexplained origin. The ones we have observed in our universe are the deterministic causes (they have definite causes themselves) and what at the moment seem undeterministic (uncertainty in quantum events).
So, our universe appears to be deterministic, with some indeterminism. But even the undetermined effects become deterministic causes of other effects, once they have appeared. And even then, there is some disagreement over the indeterminism of quantum events, in that some scientists feel they too are determined.
So, I’m not sure how we get away from the fact that all effects have a cause, and that the chain of cause and effect can in principle be accounted for. You don’t get the choice of putting aside determinism (or causality) if that’s actually how the universe works.
The point is, exactly what is the ‘will’ actually ‘free’ from? In what way is a ‘decision’ not just the effect of causes that precede it? I can’t see how you can account for free-will that is in any sense ‘free’.
“i would like to know if conscious processes play a causal role in our actions, or else we are slaves to our unconscious?”
Given everything else about the universe seems that way, and we have no reason to suspect the material brain is any different, then the default hypothesis, or the null hypothesis, should be that it’s all causal. The alternative hypothesis, that we have free-will, not only has no evidence to support it, it isn’t even a sensible notion in a causal universe.
Ok Ron
I agree that there is nothing really “free” in this world (the term is more a euphemism than a reality) but the “will” is not meaningless, perhaps neuroscience can support mechanism, but can not state anything about determinism.
For example:Suppose you should take the decision about drinking coffee or tea in the morning.maybe you decide to take the coffee today for some reason (eg you do not like the type of tea that is available)
Your “choice” was not free (previous events may have influenced the decision,like the type of tea)but in the end it was your decision, you were in accordance with this decision,although it was not completely “free” the decision is according to your desires and motivations of the time (although it is certain that those desires and motivations were determined by previous events and so on)
I must also remind you that many philosophers support determinism but none of them recognized as a certain fatalism, even in a deterministic universe.
So if the (maybe determined) conscious processes in my brain make that my arm raises,the “will” was not meaningless (perhaps determined,but not meaningless)
So, in my opinion the free will is an illusion, but the desires,enotions and intentions are not
Alexis,
“Suppose you should take the decision about drinking…previous events may have influenced the decision”
More than that. Previous events *caused* the decision.
A rock rolls down a hill and at the bottom in it’s path. The rock rolls to the right of the tree or to the left. What *made* that decision? Who or what *decided* which way it went? These terms don’t make sense in this context. But, when considering what the brain is made of they don’t make sense there either. Any *decision* we appear to make is just eh outcome of causal sequence. If it is not free to change then it could not have been otherwise. The thing is, we only every observe the one outcome of any of our apparent decisions. When people say “I could have chosen the other option”, this is just a confirmation that they feel as though they could, not that they actually could.
“the decision is according to your desires and motivations of the time”
Yes. Your brain states. Which in turn are caused by all the prior events that lead up to that point. Just like the rock, you *choice* is merely the outcome of what your brain was caused to do.
“I must also remind you that many philosophers support determinism but none of them recognized as a certain fatalism, even in a deterministic universe.”
That’s because ‘fatalism’ is used in the sense of ‘it’s in the hands of the Gods’ or ‘The Gods fated that it happen’, or in New Age terms, ‘The Cosmos fated that it should happen, or, ‘It was written in the stars’ (in the astrological sense). This meaning of fatalism isn’t the same as unguided outcomes of a dynamic universe.
“So if the (maybe determined) conscious processes in my brain make that my arm raises,the “will” was not meaningless”
Then what does ‘will’ mean in this sense. You seem to be redefining ‘will’ to be a passive term with the same meaning as ’caused to happen’ You have removed all usual notions of freely-willed agency.
“So, in my opinion the free will is an illusion, but the desires,enotions and intentions are not”
I agree, sort of. Desires, emotions and intentions are our psychological perception of complex caused events. But then free-will is the same.
Think of how we think of a wave travelling down a rope that has been flicked. There is no wave as such. There is only moving rope atoms, that move according to the connected rope atoms under the influence of an impulse. Stop the rope and the wave vanishes. But, we can still examine the motion of the rope in terms of this imagined *wave* (wavelength, frequency, amplitude). But there is no real wave that remains when the rope is stopped. You can’t touch the wave, only the moving rope.
The active buzzing busy brain is like the rope in this analogy. It is the real physical thing. Free-will, and consciousness generally is just what the active brain looks like and feel like under our introspective gaze. Stop the brain (when you’re dead) and the conscious vanishes. So, consciousness and free-will are just models of what eh brain is doing, juts as the wave is a model of the moving rope atoms.
The difference is that the rope is easy to analyze, while the brain isn’t. Having said that there are plenty of experiments on animals, such as Aplysia, which show that brains are biological mechanisms. Ours is just especially complex, difficult to understand, and looks particularly ‘free’ under the poor view of introspection.
I agree with many of your statements,however on others not, the example of the rock is too simple,if you put a stone on the edge of a cliff (while at the proper angle of course) is ALWAYS going to fall.that does not happen with humans.This reminds me of the positivism of Comte trying to apply the same rules of the natural sciences to the social
If i see a man putting his finger on the stove and observe the consequences and rationalize them, I will be forced by nature to make the same mistake? like the example of the rock?
we certainly don´t have free will but we are not forced by nature to always do the same actions and errors, we can learn from our (or others) errors (not as a rock)
“Stop the brain (when you’re dead) and the conscious vanishes.”
A:perhaps you thought the mind is something ethereal or spiritual? of course the brain creates the mind
“So, consciousness and free-will are just models of what the brain is doing, juts as the wave is a model of the moving rope atoms.”
B:In fact thay have an effect in our behavior
But we are losing the ground, the neuroscience (conscious-unconscious) and determinism cannot talk about each other. Thats unscientific,
Again i´m not a compatibilist, but its seems incorrect to me to talk about “philosophical or natural determinism” in a post about the neuroscience and the “Neuroscientific free will” (note the euphemism)
Alexis,
“that does not happen with humans”
It does. If you put them at the edge of a cliff at the proper angle they will always fall.
You are missing the implication that human brains, although much more complex, are still constrained by the activity of their neurons, which in turn are constrained by chemistry and physics. You still have not explained what is extra that turns the complexity of this physical system into something that could have done otherwise.
People are prepared to place bets on events such as “If I roll this rock down the hill, which side of the tree will it land? How much would you bet?” In that case it’s our epistemic uncertainty that prevents us from knowing, not the deterministic nature of the roll of the rock. It it lands to the left it was always going to land to the left.
Only the religious think they can change the course of events, by praying. It’s the same mistake that proponents of free-will are making. Whatever your brain was going to do, given everything leading up to the point of some ‘decision’, it was going to do anyway, and which way the ‘decision’ goes is determined too. It just feels to us as if we make things happen by some ‘free’ choice. We can’t see the ‘dice’ of the brain rolling according to complex details, and so it feels as if we choose freely which way it lands.
“This reminds me of the positivism of Comte trying to apply the same rules of the natural sciences to the social”
Well, with the social, multiple interacting brains, it’s far more complex than figuring out what a single brain will do. Compared to that even the weather is simple. And, ‘natural laws’ is a misnomer. All ‘natural laws’ are man made models of patterns found in nature. Very complex systems are not amenable to the application of the simple models we can construct. This is why he failed. Leplace’s demon is required to actually do the epistemic work of calculating the ontological determinism. We are not.
“If i see a man…I will be forced by nature to make the same mistake?”
No, because it’s not the same circumstances. The light into you eyes and the sound of his scream into your ears *causes* events to happen in your brain, events ingrained by evolution, which *cause* your brain-body to recoil at the prospect. It is more likely that it is *determined* that you won’t that than you will. It is still a causal complex chain of events that in humans rises in the mind as fear of pain.
“not forced by nature to always do the same actions and errors”
Of course not, but for deterministic reasons. there is no choice. Just as seeing the man burn himself, had that man been you then no doubt you would have *learned* (your physical brain would have laid down deep memory to *make* you body recoil when it’s in similar circumstances)
There are of course causes of change in the brain that overcome this learning, by changing the brain to continue with the destructive behaviour. Addiction is a great example of how we are no ‘free’ to choose.
“perhaps you thought the mind is something ethereal or spiritual?”
No, I’m trying to emphasise that it isn’t. The brain doesn’t as much create the mind as the mind is what we ‘see’ of a brain in action, just as the wave is what we see of a rope in action.
“But we are losing the ground, the neuroscience (conscious-unconscious) and determinism cannot talk about each other.”
Yes, but I don’t think you get the significance. It’s the woolly ‘free-will’ notion that’s in error. Neuroscience is one of the sciences that tries to the causal nature of what is happening in the brain. It’s the ‘free-will’ proponents who fail to explain how the notions of ‘free’ and ‘I could have done otherwise’ fit into our causal understanding of the universe.
But ‘philosophical determinism’ is simply the name that philosophers apply to the consequences of that other philosophical term, ‘causality’. It is not something different. If there is cause and effect then the effect is *determined* by the cause. That’s what it means. The science of quantum physics has made our understanding of the universe more complicated. But even so, what are undeterministic events to us, still have causes when the occur: they contribute to the determination of what follows. And more fundamentally those indeterminate events will have causes, but we can’t, for now, figure out what they are. But the whole of science is built on our understanding of causality.
You seem to be making contradictory claims. You say you are not a compatibilist, but by definition a compatibilist is someone who thinks that we are still free, in the sense of ‘I could have done otherwise’.
Heh. I’m surprised this thread came to life again.. I feel a strong need for 5 sophomores and some pitchers of beer. Free will, do we have it? Could we even TELL from the ‘inside’? Probably not. Intrinsically unanswerable.
“Free will, do we have it? Could we even TELL from the ‘inside’? Probably not.”
Precisely. Introspection is the wrong tool for examining the brain. The brain has no sensory nerves that detect it’s own detailed action, so there is no mechanism for the self-aware parts to sense the action of its own neurons, let alone correlate them to particular feelings. This is why thoughts seem to float free of the physical brain from the perspective of the conscious working of the brain.
“Intrinsically unanswerable.” – By using introspection, I agree. Though neuroscience has not got there yet there is no intrinsic barrier.
I respectfully disagree, especially Ron’s point that the brain has no means to detect is own detailed action. Frankly that is uninformed.
Here is one way a neuroscientist could look at the issue of free will:
Human brains make choices consciously and subconsciously by real-time evaluation of alternatives in terms of what has been learned previously from other situations and of their anticipated utility. The conscious brain is aware that it is aware of this choice processing and makes decisions in light of such understanding.
When a given alternative choice is not forced, the conscious mind is aware that it is not obliged to accept any one choice but is “free” to select any one of the available options. Such realization might even guide many decisions at the subconscious level. In either case, the probable value of each alternative is weighed in neural networks, which collectively reach a “decision” by inhibiting networks that lead to less-favored alternatives. Thus, network activity underlying the preferred choice prevails and leads to a willed action selectively favoring the final choice.
Clearly, the final choice is directed by neural network activity. What governs that network activity is the activity in other networks, which in turn is governed by stored memories and real-time processing of the current environmental choice contingencies.
What usually gets left out of free-will discussions is the question of how a brain establishes stored-memory preferences and how it evaluates current contingencies. These functions are surely causal, but what is the cause of the cause? Any given brain can choose within certain limits its learning experiences and what it will store as lasting memory. Those choices in turn are often governed by what a brain has learned about the self-interest value associated with given contingencies. So, in some sense, it is learned values that underlie much of choice behavior. It is the brain that assigns value. The real question is whether values are freely chosen or imposed. Values are largely optional choices. The conscious brain directs the choices that govern value formation and reinforcement. Conscious mind makes these choices in the context of its sense of self.
The Brain’s Avatar Role in Choice Making
Now we are confronted with explaining how a circuit impulse patterns (CIP) representation of the sense of self can have a free will. First, I reason that each person has a conscious Avatar that is created by brain as an active agent to act in the world on embodied brain’s behalf. (1) Certainly, by definition, the Avatar can make choices and decisions. In that sense, the Avatar may have been released to make its own choices and decisions which can be free in the sense that they are not dictated by subconscious mind. Subconscious mind can certainly exert its own imperatives, but does not always have the power to veto the Avatar choices.
If the avatar exists as CIPs, how can something as “impersonal” and physiological as that have any kind of “will,” much less free will. Let us recall that “will” is little more than an intent that is often coupled with bodily actions to achieve the intent. We know this kind of thing occurs in the circuitry that controls non-conscious and sub-conscious minds. These circuits automatically generate actions in response to conditions that call for a response. Such actions are stereotyped and inflexible whenever they are controlled without conscious oversight. Why then, cannot similar processes operate in a less constrained way by the Avatar’s CIP representation? They can, and the difference is that in the Avatar, the action may be one of several possibilities and the Avatar is less constrained about which one to pick. In other words, the Avatar — because it is an avatar —is more free to pick an option. You might say that when the brain generated the CIPs to represent the sense of self, those CIPs were endowed with a certain autonomy and freedom of action not available to the other CIPs in the brain that constituted non-conscious and sub-conscious mind.
Is our Avatar compelled to believe in God or to be an atheist? Is it compelled to accept one moral code over any other, or any code for that matter? Is it compelled to become a certain kind of person, with no option to “improve” ourselves in any self-determined way? If so, what or who does the compelling? How does it help understanding of “free will” to say that we are compelled by our neural network impulses?
So, it seems to this Avatar that current debates about determinism, free will, compatibilism, are meretricious ways to obscure the important matters of our humanness. The door to understanding what is really going on is slammed shut by assertions that value choices and the decisions that flow from them cannot be free because they are caused by neural circuit impulse patterns. “Free will” debates distract us from a proper framing of the issues about human choices and personal responsibility.
(1) Klemm, W. R. 2011. Atoms of Mind. New York: Springer.
“Clearly, the final choice is directed by neural network activity.”
What follows this in your comment is pretty much the deterministic account:
“What governs that network activity is the activity in other networks, which in turn is governed by stored memories and real-time processing of the current environmental choice contingencies.”
“These functions are surely causal, but what is the cause of the cause?”
Other causes. The activity of the brain in complex feedback systems, using memory and other current states of the brain.
“Any given brain can choose within certain limits its learning experiences and what it will store as lasting memory.”
But seeing this as ‘choosing’ is the very illusion. Let me be clear on this point: the claim that free-will is illusory is the claim that any brain outcome, even those that we feel are freely willed, are the result of causal events in the brain. The illusion is not that this is how we feel (for I agree, we do feel wee freely will our ‘choices’). The illusion is that somehow this is free of causal prior events. What we see as the outcome of ‘choice’ is the outcome of natural physical causes.
The brain doesn’t *choose* what to learn, it just learns by way of those neural inputs, together with prior memories, that cause the more persistent memories. This is the inner detail.
An example of how this appears: to the consciousness self-aware brain it might feel we choose to learn about the brain, say by deciding to study neuroscience. But really, what has happened is that deterministic events of the past have built up to pique an interest in a subject, and more reading has strengthened the memory, the knowledge, of the subject, and has driven the person to ‘decide’ to study the subject. The causal effects lie so deep and the detail is so complex that we don’t get to be aware of this level of detail. The consequence is that the conscious brain has this feeling, this notion, that it has made a decision.
“So, in some sense, it is learned values that underly much of choice behaviour.”
Yes. The memories, the patterns in the brain, are biased in favour of one particular outcome over another. It doesn’t matter how far back or how recent effects are, they are still determining the outcome that we feel is a choice.
Apart from the fact that we can’t throw a dice consistently it’s still a mechanical system that is deterministic (ignoring quantum level effects for now on such a large object). Even in such a regular homogeneous cube, its action on being thrown is still sufficiently indeterminate to us to make it look random. Or, if we anthropomorphize it, the dice has ‘chosen’ which way to land.
Clearly a brain is very much more complex that this. There is still plenty of hidden scope for a great deal of epistemological indeterminacy, even excluding quantum effects, even in a totally deterministic universe.
So, suppose I like tea and coffee equally well, and at some instant there is no particular desire, no thirst – perhaps I’m reading a book. And unexpectedly (no time to deliberate up to this point) my wife asks me if I’d like a tea or coffee, I might feel I deliberate momentarily, and feel I make a choice. But in the detail of the brain there is enough complexity, far more than in a dice throw, that when I utter ‘tea’, that was caused by something – some cause. The cause appears to me, in anthropomorphizing my own brain activity, to be a ‘choice’. I could alternatively say, in thinking of the dice, that my ‘choice’ was random (so not actually an intentional choice). Or, in keeping with the laws of physics I could say that my ‘choice’ was a determined outcome of the fact that, under those precise circumstances at that time, my tea liking memories overrode my coffee liking memories, and caused, in a way determined by the relative strength of those patterns, that my brain causes tea to be selected. From then on, all the way out to my utterance of “Tea please.”, is in turn caused. The prior cause that you are really looking for is not a ‘free’ choice, but one determined by my prior brain states – in this case the strength of the tea pattern compared to the strength of the coffee pattern.
Had my wife asked just a second later, then other effects in my brain might have caused, deterministically, the coffee pattern to be the more dominant cause of the outcome.
Our lack of free-will can be illustrated in choice experiments, where the researchers can prime subjects quite reliably into making specific ‘choices’. The subjects still think they are choosing. In other words they were not free choices, but outcomes of prior causes – just very complex combinations of causes.
Again, we should not misinterpret our epistemic indeterminacy, our inability to monitor the minute causal detail of the brain, as free-will.
“The Brain’s Avatar Role in Choice Making”
This is just an anthropomorphic model of brain action that is designed to use the very feeling of agency that is in question. I could do the same for a rolling dice. I could say that the dice has an avatar that determines which way up it lands. Clearly we can frame models to fit our preconceptions.
“So, it seems to this Avatar that current debates about determinism, free will, compatibilism, are meretricious ways to obscure the important matters of our humanness.”
So now we begin to return to the humanness, which in turn leads to the spiritual and the religious. Science should be showing us what is the case, not what we want to be the case. The very use of he word ‘meretricious’ is already indicating a hidden agenda. There is nothing at all meretricious about understanding the illusory nature of free-will. Your motivation and bias is showing through.
“”Free will” debates distract us from a proper framing of the issues about human choices and personal responsibility.”
No they do not. This really misses the point.
There is nothing in the illusory free-will position that requires us to give up free-will as a model. In science it’s possible, and common, to use many different models. The free-will model is very handy as a means of describing some psychological effects. The use of the notion of agency allows us to describe the extent to which behaviours are localised in a material object that has a high degree of autonomy, such as a human.
We have no trouble ignoring relativistic effects most of the time. Newtonian mechanics are adequate at most speeds we are familiar with. We choose the model most appropriate to the task.
One particular benefit of the illusory free-will model is that it makes us think of even wider causes and effects. It also, by impersonalising behaviour, removes the need for retribution and all the ghastly notions of sin that religions have been imposing on us for millenia.
It very specifically does not remove the notion of responsibility. Responsibility, in deterministic terms, is a measure of the localisation of autonomy. If a man walks down a street striking several people on the head, then it is still correct to say that that man, that determined partly autonomous object, has the most localised responsibility for those actions. Certainly the most effective action is to restrain him. That done, the next is to figure out what caused him to do it. What are the causal determinants. By thinking of it this way, and understanding the very complex nature of causality in action, we are not imposing silly notions such as sinfulness and freely willed evilness, which prevent us looking further.
But of course the judicial systems of the world have been aware of the potential for extenuating circumstances anyway. Long gone are the auto-responsive mob lynchings and stonings. Everyone gets a fair chance to make their case. So really, the deterministic view isn’t changing as much as you fear.
Good reasoning/research. Still, by any means, mind trying to determine if it has free will is simply an attempt to lift yourself by your bootstraps. If we are on rails we’d never be able to see it. Absolutely intrinsically unanswerable by any means internal to thought…and what isn’t?
I know.. no fun at all there.
you’re doing it again ron
Remember Neuroscience keep silence about determinism and vice versa
Our brains are the most complexly organized things in the known universe,no one fully understands them (although there are people like Sam Harris who think they know everything)
This post is about the “neuroscientific free will” (remember the euphemism)the role of the unconscious and the conscious in our (perhaps determined) actions and thoughts do you remember that?
Or we talk about determinism or we talk about neuroscience but we can´t talk about both at the same time,and since this is a blog about the brain neuroscience has the advantage on the debate.
“Our lack of free-will can be illustrated in choice experiments, where the researchers can prime subjects quite reliably into making specific ‘choices’. The subjects still think they are choosing. In other words they were not free choices, but outcomes of prior causes – just very complex combinations of causes.”
seems that dualism has influenced you
That´s so old (and obvious in a materialistic brain) of course if you magnetically stimulate the brain you can change the course of the decisions (but only SIMPLY decisions like pressing the left or the right button) another example of the complexity of the brain that no one fully understands
I agree we don’t fully understand how the brain works. But ‘free-will’ still implies us being ‘free’, in the sense that “I could have done otherwise”. I would like to know why proponents of free-will think that is the case.
“Or we talk about determinism or we talk about neuroscience but we can´t talk about both at the same time”
Of course we can – we must. Because all science is founded on our understanding of cause and effect. And if a cause causes an effect the effect is determined by the cause. The fact that this is complex and that many causes contribute to some specific effect does not get you out of this.
The whole notion of free-will and “I could have done otherwise” is directly counter to causality. It is to say that no matter what causes bring my brain to a point where it will go in some specific direction (a specific ‘choice’), I (and what this ‘I’ is is never explained) can be free of these causes and make my brain go in a different direction, to make if ‘choose’ otherwise. It’s saying that this magical ‘I’ can counter the causal model we have of the universe. So, free-will is the oddity that needs explaining in this sense: how does it fit with our causal understanding of the universe.
And, the fact that we ‘feel’ we have free-will is not good enough. Such introspective feelings on the matter are not a good guide as to what is going on.
Ron
I (we) agree that we don´t have “free will”,but there is a difference between saying that we have no free will and say that all our behavior is unconciously controlled,that´s the topic of this post.Klemm argues that the conscious and the unconscious work together to make all the (“determined”) behavior.There´s no good evidence to say that we are “slaves” of the unconscious.Perhaps the “Classical free will” is dead but the “neuroscientific free will” is not. there is no evidence to say that the conscious does not have a causal role in our actions that´s the point of this post.
P.D:Please note ron that the “Neuroscientific free will” is only a term that i use to explain the roles of the conscious and the unconscious in the human behavior,do not take it so literally
Alexis,
“there is a difference between saying that we have no free will and say that all our behaviour is unconsciously controlled, that´s the topic of this post”
But, there is no demonstration in neuroscience that the conscious is not caused by, determined by, the unconscious. In fact there are plenty of examples where the conscious is controlled by the unconscious – as in experiments on how priming can cause subjects to make specific determined conscious decisions.
The problem is that, because consciousness cannot yet be fully accounted for by neuroscience, neuroscience isn’t in a position to say one way or the other.
My argument is based purely on the fact that there is no evidence to show that consciousness is independent of the unconscious, along with our understanding of causality (i.e. there are no gaps in which any notion of the conscious making totally free uncaused ‘decisions’ makes any sense).
What I find is that there is a commitment to the notion of free-will that creeps into arguments by already assuming agency.
It’s really important to get this point. Take this explanation of the error:
“While many errors in deduction are due to making unjustified inferences from premises [i.e. validity], the vast majority of unsound deductive arguments are probably due to premises that are questionable or false. For example, many researchers on psi have found statistical anomalies and have inferred from this data that they have found evidence for psi. The error, however, is one of assumption, not inference. The researchers assume that psi is the best explanation for the statistical anomaly. If one makes this assumption, then one’s inference from the data is justified. However, the assumption is questionable and the arguments based on it are unsound. Similar unsound reasoning occurs in the arguments that intercessory prayer heals and that psychics get messages from the dead.”
The same error of assumption is being made throughout Bill’s paper, this post and many of the comments. They are assuming agency (and the associated notion of the will being free: “I could have done otherwise”) is the best explanation, and then using that assumption as if true. It’s a form of begging the question, affirming the consequent, and probably other errors.
The error is masked by the way in which it is framed. There are usually statements of support for causality, and that nothing they are claiming contravenes causality. Then somewehre there is a reversion to uncaused causes, hidden in language like ‘neuroscientific free will’. What is ‘neuroscientific free will’? What is it free of? Causality, of being caused? How?
“Please note ron that the “Neuroscientific free will” is only a term that i use to explain the roles of the conscious and the unconscious in the human behavior,do not take it so literally”
Then how should I take it? Ficticiously? As fantasy? Note how conscious and unconscious, human behaviour have creap back into the explanation. But aren’t these the things we’re trying to explain? You can’t use them this way:
P1) Causality holds throughout – I’m not denying causality.
P2) We have consciousness independent of unconsciousness.
C) Threefore our conscious will is free of our unconscious.
You have stated your conclusion in a premise. And, P2 contradicst P1.
Note that if you reject P1 (I don’t think you do) then you have other problems. But then so does all of science. We get into the problem of cause and effect due to the understanding of Time, problems that lead to solipsism, etc.
The point that is being missed is that causality, and the lack of evidence from neuroscience to support this notion of the will being free, or the conscious being independent of the unconscious, requires that you explain this missing link. Where is the neuroscience evidence that shows that there is no cause of conscious decisions? Where is the explanation of principle of how the conscious could be free from causal effects?
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“there is no evidence to say that the conscious does not have a causal role in our actions that´s the point of this post.”
But again you are missing the point. The conscious does have a causal role – it must in a causal system. This isn’t in dispute. What is in dispute, and that which you still avoid, is what causes the conscious action? And, in what way is this conscious action free of prior determinants?
“There´s no good evidence to say that we are “slaves” of the unconscious.”
There is zero evidence that we are not. But, note the emotive use of language like ‘slaves’ (see my next comment). This concept, of one agent being the controller of another, goes out of the window in the physics of causality. This too is an important point:
When moving ball A collides with a static ball B we attribute (by anthropomorphic notions) that A ‘hits’ B; or we say A causes B to move. But when A hits B it’s just as correct to say static B hits moving A, because the ‘event’ (the collision) is a mutual coming together, actually caused by prior events involving A and B. The moving A and static B, at some instant, is the prior event that causes some later event, the collision, and some later event still, the final motions of A and B. Because as much as A causes change in momentum B, so B causes change in momentum A.
Now, in what way is a conscious ‘decision’ not an actually caused ‘decision’, that is a causal consequence of other activity in the brain and influences, both over time and very recent, from the environment.
The conscious part of the brain is not a closed system independent of other parts. It even looks like conscious activity is distributed to a great extent, so that there is no one location of consciousness. Traditionally it was thought to be located in the neocortex, but we now know that deeper parts of the brain are integral to notions of self, which is essential for self-awareness, which is the core of ‘identity’ that makes us feel like agents. And agency makes us feel like agents that can ‘will’ actions. And, because we can’t locate prior causes we feel like this ‘will’ is somehow ‘free’.
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If you look deeper, question further, you will generally find that it boils down to variations on the following:
1) Religious belief requires that there be souls, or some kind of free will, that is consistent with the religious notions of sin. This appears to be the cause of Bill’s motivation. He doesn’t say it explicitly, but look back at the comments. Response: Science is only interested in what is the case, not what you want to believe is the case.
Follow here, and here. Religion creeps in, but the offer to continue from there is declined. Contemplate Bill’s response:
“I’m sorry, I have grown weary of this discussion. I don’t think reason can resolve the issues. Some things may just not be knowable.
What? This is the response from someone who has spent years investigating neuroscience, reasoning about scientific results, but who thinks Jesus has some bearing on the matter, but because that is being challenged all of a sudden it’s beyond reason? This is religious motivation.
2) Loss of humanism. Atheist humanist belief that our humanism is so special (Raymond Tallis) that we must have free-will. This is a remnant of the religious view of specialness. Response: Claims to specialness are no better than claims from authority. Where’s the science to show we are special.
3) Loss of freedom. This is usually frames as a fear of being ‘slaves’ of our unconscious, or a fear of ‘fatalism’. Response: If this is the case, then it is, and no amount of fear will change what is the case. This is another argument from what we want to be true rather than what is true.
4) “It’s obvious” – That is, based on the vividness of the perception, surely we must have free-will. Response: Our introspective feelings of what is obvious are shown to be unreliable when considering matters at the edge of our understanding.
5) Without free-will we have nihilism. What happens to ‘responsibility’? Response: That isn’t a problem (read this comment, and this one). But the correct response is: consequences don’t determine what is the case. This is another version of rejecting the idea because you don’t want it to be true.
6) Ontological v Epistemological Determinism – This distinction causes a number of problems. That we can’t figure out what is happening, that is we suffer epistemic indeterminism, does not mean that underlying causality is not ontologically determinate – even in quantum physics. Even if the universe were totally ontologically deterministic (i.e. no quantum stuff or any hint of uncertainty) it would still be indeterminate to us (you cannot determine states of a system if you are part of the system). This is why the notion of Leplace’s demon is used to express determination in principle.
These, and possibly other drivers, are persuading proponents of free-will to be so committed to it that they assume it (via agency, or consciousness), and then argue from there, with no supporting evidence. So, they are making the error of assuming what they propose to show.
You might think I am equally committed to determinism, but I’m not. Everything is contingent to me. Show me that causlity does not hold, and then show me evidence that consciousness is independent of the unconscious, or that “I could have done otherwise” is possible, and I’ll be persuaded.
Ok Ron
Again we ALL know that the brain creates the mind (and the conscious) but the unconscious drives completely our behavior? No
Even neuroscientists like Benjamin Libet and John Dylan Haynes say that his experiments cannot provide empirical evidence that says that everything is done by the unconscious (the only one that says those things is Sam Harris….but he is a joke!!)
On the issue of religion i think that you are using an “ad hominem” argument. That Klemm believes in god doesn´t make it a bad (or a good) scientist!!! he bases his assumptions on empirical evidence.I have read the paper and it´s seems logical to me (and the peer reviewers of “Advances in cognitive psychology)
So Ron calm down….You do not want to be a pseudoscientist….don´t you?
Hi Alexis,
Let’s get a couple of points out of the way first before getting back on topic.
I’m not sure what the ‘calm down’ is for. I haven’t been introducing emotive language at all – in fact I’ve tried to explain how your use of emotive language, such as ‘slaves to the unconscious’ is an indication of emotive influences.
Even your request that I calm down, having done nothing but explained where I think you are going wrong, is itself a deflection from answering the points I made.
You also misunderstand ad hominem:
“The ad hominem fallacy is often confused with the legitimate provision of evidence that a person is not to be trusted. Calling into question the reliability of a witness is relevant when the issue is whether to trust the witness. It is irrelevant, however, to call into question the reliability or morality or anything else about a person when the issue is whether that person’s reasons for making a claim are good enough reasons to support the claim.”
Now here, please don’t jump off at the deep end. This is not to be misunderstood that Bill is untrustworthy. I’m sure Bill is a really nice and honest guy. I’ve read nothing that would suggest otherwise.
The point is that his religious beliefs seem to be driving his views on free-will. This isn’t directed at just Bill, but is a crucial part of Christian faith itself. So anyone who submits themselves to the Christian faith (and many others), if committed to their religion, as many claim they are, and if they give primacy to the teachings of their religion, as many do, then it is a prerequisite of that religion that they believe in original sin and free-will as part of the doctrine.
So, it has a direct bearing on this argument. It is not a ad hominem attack.
Now, back to business.
I gave plenty of responses to your points, and you haven’t really addressed any. You’ve actually repeated one of the key errors.
“Again we ALL know that the brain creates the mind (and the conscious) but the unconscious drives completely our behaviour? No”
I made it very clear that the ‘conscious’ aspects of the brain do contribute to causal behaviour. Let me repeat your words:
“there is no evidence to say that the conscious does not have a causal role in our actions that´s the point of this post.”
And mine:
“The conscious does have a causal role – it must in a causal system. This isn’t in dispute. What is in dispute, and that which you still avoid, is what causes the conscious action?”
So, where do I say that “the unconscious drives completely our behaviour”? I don’t know how to make this any clearer. What are you missing? Let’s try the following:
The relationships I am claiming is the case is this:
1) Environment -> Unconscious
2) Unconscious -> Conscious
3) Unconscious+Conscious -> (Unconscious, Conscious, Behaviour, Environment)
The crucial point in the causal link is that the Conscious is not free of causes. Bear in mind the following:
The conscious has no direct access to the environment through our senses. All senses enter the brain at points we cannot detect directly with our conscious facilities. I cannot detect molecules triggering smells in the neurons in my nose. I cannot detect the saccades of my eyes as they provide snapshots to build up my fluid vision – and looking in a mirror I can’t even see my eyes move because the route to my consciousness is disconnected during movement. And nor can I detect which parts of my visual cortex are processing the various aspects of a scene, which bits deal with movement detection, horizontal lines, vertical lines, and so on. My auditory system hears words, but the words arrive into my brain as the firing of a large number of neurons, not as words. All this processing is dealt with before the results become conscious.
So, could you try again to point out where the conscious is actually free of this causal connectivity to such an extent that it qualifies as being ‘free’ to act, to be ‘independent’. How does it do it?
Remember, you and Bill are making the claim that there is free-will. I’m not claiming anything other than we should expect our conscious facilities to be caused, like everything else. Where is there room for “I could have done otherwise”?
Ron, I completely agree with you here. I believe that the issue really comes down to how we define “free will”. I define it as having the ability to make a choice that is not made through a causal chain (no determinism) and not made through randomness (no ontological indeterminism). Since both determinism and indeterminism must be negated for free will to exist (which is LOGICALLY impossible), then free will can’t exist. It’s really that simple. This shows that free will must be an illusion which is a reasonable theory given the fact that is would be a result of our extremely limited cognitive perception of reality (layers and layers of subjective experience with no objectivity possible). From a psychological perspective, I’m in line with Wegner’s “Theory of Apparent Mental Causation” — that is, that the illusion of free will is easily created by the 3 principles that relate our thought to our actions: priority, consistency, and exclusivity. These are the only 3 “ingredients” one needs to experience this illusion and our mind is certainly capable of this. For the logical reasons and more, it is most obvious that free will is an illusion. It’s just hard to accept by anyone who wants to hold onto certain religious beliefs, moral responsibility, pride, etc.
I responded to your other post above with very much the same issue on the logic.
I have to say though that the ‘illusion’ is that we think free-will is genuinely contra-causally free. That we have the illusion, the feeling, that we have free-will I’m not disputing. Even though I think the ‘free’ nature of our will is an illusion and can acknowledge that intellectually, I also acknowledge that we are stuck with the illusion. Much like in being earth bound I sign up to the illusion of a sun-’rise’ and a sun-’set’ while knowing that the experience that the sun rises and sets is a real experience, but what is actually happening is something else. In both cases the illusion (the error if you like) is what we feel is happening.
So, despite protestations from free-will proponents, there is no need to lose our feeling of free-will. With regard to responsibility the key issue is the degree of autonomy an entity has (i.e. the localisation of where the predominant causal events are). By looking at it this way we can detach ourselves from the retributive instincts that religion seems to be stuck with in insisting on a real freedom of the will. We can instead look at problems of responsibility as problems of localised cause and effect, as pragmatic matters of finding solutions. If anything it allows us to merge this pragmatism with our positive moral drives to look for just and fair solutions, rather than to have our judgement sullied by notions of sin.
Ron,
Yes, I would say that there is no reason to abandon our feeling of free will. I believe it to be an illusion based on how our mind works with respect to the order of operations, our mode of conceptualization and time itself.
Yes, with regard to contra-causally free will, this would mean that we are “causa sui” or initiators of cause, which violates logic and would make us God-like. By definition, God is an entity that is causa sui, so making us the same way, makes us God-like. This in itself could produce contradictions with regard to religious views, as the same religious folks tend to separate us from this “God” only giving “God” these types of powers. This means that you’d have to remove “God’s” ability to see the future, which then falsifies the definition of God as an omniscient being. There are so many levels that free will can be refuted, even if we are forced to argue on religious grounds alone which is sometimes very fun to do (even without logic one can use their religious opponents own beliefs to disprove it).
Regardless of the argument, the simple fact that determinism and/or indeterminism (randomness) exist, free will can’t exist by definition. It is a simple argument that requires no further thought. The universe does operate on these principles for all practical purposes that we know, as intellect itself is based on causal links and predictability, and quantum randomness adds the opposite but equally damning factor as well. It’s still fascinating to talk about. To think, that either I had no other option but to write this post, or that anything I may think of as creative is a product of randomness is amazing! Nice chatting with you!
Peace and love!
Ron,
I wanted to add that moral responsibility and accountability for our actions is also something requiring precise definition. Technically while we may be “responsible” for our actions because we were a part of the causal chain, any other entity in the universe is equally responsible as they contributed to the state of the universe necessary for that action to take place. People that kill others or get their PhD had no other choice. Their actions were a result of either randomness or determinism (causal chain) so they themselves shouldn’t be proud or ashamed for their past as it was out of their control. I think that this is another reason why people can’t accept that we don’t have true free will. They want to feel like they did a great job and earned their accomplishments (even though it was out of their control), and they want to hold somebody or something responsible for actions they consider to be “evil”. Nothing else could have happened though, if we reversed time, except a random change (due to quantum randomness if it is truly random). People want to feel proud of their accomplishments, or smart or above average, or what have you — but it wasn’t up to them so those feelings are just a part of the illusion (as nice as they may feel sometimes). I remember this to keep myself in check. All we can do is fulfill the illusion while at least being aware of and accepting it. Peace!
Dr. Klemm,
First of all, your use of the term “subconscious” implies a lay understanding of the subject — lets use the correct term “unconscious” from now on so that we all can take you seriously as someone learned in the subject of psychology. I’ll let it slide and just continue with my rebuttal.
Second, these arguments of yours trying to invalidate the conclusions of illusionists don’t matter anyways, because the mere fact that the universe is either deterministic and/or indeterministic negates the logical possibility of free will.
First to define free will, I would say that most people would agree that this term implies that a true choice is made without 100% predictability (determinism) and it can’t just be random (indeterminism).
If people are true choosers of their actions or choices (causa sui), then their actions can’t have a cause except themselves. To abandon causality is to abandon consistency and the very foundation of intellect and general reasoning. If you have complete causality, then the choice was a result of events in the past and out of the agent’s control. So the psychological arguments, although relevant, are not even necessary to disprove free will. One need only consider that ontological determinism (causal chain) and indeterminism (quantum randomness) negate the logical possibility of free will. That’s all there is to it. Thus, free will must be an illusion since it does not really exist. If we are to ignore this simple logical argument based on determinism and indeterminism, then there is still loads of evidence that suggest that our unconscious mind, genes, and environmental conditioning (Skinner, et al) is responsible for our actions — and still suggests that free will does not exist. It’s hard for most people to accept this illusionism, especially if their religion depends on their belief in free will as they will defend it to hold on to their identity, but in those cases logic has already been abandoned anyways and then it fails to remain in the realm of scientific discussion. More specifically those that believe in an omniscient “God” would have to believe that this “God” can’t know the future, for if that “God” did even have access to this knowledge, would imply determinism and no free will. To say that this “God” doesn’t have this ability is to say that this “God” isn’t omniscient/omnipotent and would therefore cease to be “God” by definition. These same religious folks would say that “God” IS omniscient and omnipotent so there is no logical way to reconcile these contradictions. So even based on religious grounds alone, free will is contradictory and proven to be false.
In summary, I’ve seen many arguments that disprove the existence of true free will (even based on simple definitions and logic), but I’ve seen zero (that’s right zero) logical arguments that imply that we do have it. The only logical evidence we have points in the direction that we have an illusion of free will.
Peace and love!
Ok both have reason just some things to clarify
Ron i agree with you about that we dont have free will (i mentioned that in another comments) i´m not a compatibilist
1:The objective of this article (although the title says otherwise) is not to provide empirical evidence showing that free will exists,is to provide evidence against many neuroscientists and psychologists (Michael Gazzaniga,Daniel M Wegner,Sam harris)they say that our unconscious makes decisions and execute actions before we are aware of (that in many cases is false)and the conscious doesn´t play any causal role in our actions (false).i think that the term “neuroscientific free will” was misunderstood let´s call it now “conscious control” that conscious control is not dead.
2:The religion issue doesn´t matter is these things,we are talking about neuroscience (and some physics) the religion should play no role in these discussions.the religion of Doctor klemm not hinder their case supporting “conscious control” (please note that i´m an atheist too)
3:The term “subconscious” although it is not correct is often used to refer to the unconscious (not only used by Klemm, many articles and even universities use it because it´s better understood)so that´s no count for making an argument valid better analyze the content rather than conceptual errors better analyze the content rather than conceptual errors (actually in his paper klemm says that the “subconsious is really a part of the unconscious)
so that´s all
sorry for the errors
so…the debate is over?? hey guys (Klemm,ron,lage)you have nothing more to say about this (interesting) topic?
But please if this post comes to the live again,please don´t start with discussions about religion or philosophy, that’s why there are forums for these topics
No, not over. I’m writing a more complete response to this post and Bill’s paper. I’ve been busy with other things.
“But please if this post comes to the live again,please don´t start with discussions about religion or philosophy, that’s why there are forums for these topics”
But if the mistakes being made are philosophical ones, and if biases of religious belief are persuading anyone to make those mistakes it’s correct to bring them up here, in context.
On religion in particular I merely pointed out that it was a mistake to use the religious perspective in this debate. It was Bill, the author of the post, who ran with that an illustrated how religious thinking colours the debate. So, the religious dimension is unavoidable in debates about free-will.
And, this whole debate about free-will remains a philosophical one. Having a philosophical perspective is at the heart of science itself. Get the philosophy wrong and you make incorrect inferences from what science there is. Remember, the position that free-will is an illusion is a philosophical logical one, and a scientific null hypothesis.
Every notion humans have that they have free-will comes only from introspection – which Bill himself says is inadequate in his paper when ruling out neuroscience experiments that use it. I agree with him on that point. But it cuts both ways. Any feeling that we have free-will, or that “It was ‘me’ that ‘decided’ to learn piano”, or “I could have done otherwise” relies entirely on introspection and should be dismissed from the debate.
Alexis,
Since it’s clear that “free will” in the truest sense, does not exist (despite Klemm’s conclusion that it DOES exist), we as readers here can specifically discuss the different roles of the conscious vs. the unconscious with regard to causality and more importantly priority. However, as Ron pointed out, the philosophical and religious issues do come into play and are thus relevant. For the sake of maintaining focus on what you have interest in, in my response here, I will just focus on the causal and priority issues of the conscious vs. unconscious mind.
First of all, I believe that we can agree on the definition of consciousness, and I would say that unconsciousness encompasses all brain processes that are not included in this conscious “mode”. This means that anything that is outside of my waking consciousness is “handled” by the unconscious. So several questions that one might want to ask with regard to this topic are:
What processes occur before you have a conscious thought or consciously “will” to do something?
How does the conscious mind fit in with regard to an individual’s experiential frame of reference?
I think that most experts would agree that the mind undergoes numerous unconscious processes before one can develop a question mentally or contemplate a choice of any kind (consciously). What “mode” is governing these processes since we are not aware of them? The unconscious of course. It is also clear that the mind employs an ever-changing time-dependent reference frame to make the decision or formulate a thought. The reference frame itself is something that depends on the unconscious mind, as it certainly doesn’t seem that a person is consciously thinking about every moral, value, opinion, etc. that formed the very frame of reference that they employ when “making a decision” or “having a thought” consciously. This implies that the unconscious mind ultimately has priority over the conscious as this frame of reference is ultimately created by the unconscious mind. I’m not arguing that the conscious mind isn’t involved with complex tasks such as proprioceptive feedback loops, etc., nor am I arguing that it doesn’t have a role in executing the decision. The question you may be trying to address here is whether or not the conscious mind is ultimately responsible (has priority) for a decision made rather than the unconscious mind.
If an individual’s frame of reference is created by the unconscious mind and the conscious mind merely has an abbreviated interpretation of what this frame of reference is (our conscious “version” of reality), it is abiding by the frame of reference like a set of semi-fluidic instructions. While the conscious mind is our interface to the world and the only interface that the unconscious uses to accomplish anything in our reality, I think that because the conscious mind is operating like a computer and following unconscious instructions, it can’t be the creator or initial cause of any choice.
Here’s an interesting thought experiment: Ask someone who believes in God’s existence (or something that is unfalsifiable), if they can “temporarily” choose to not believe in God’s existence. Can they really choose to do this? Or is their “choice” really non-existent with them having only one possibility by their unconscious frame of reference? Ask someone who’s favorite ice cream flavor is chocolate, if they can “temporarily” choose vanilla as their favorite flavor. Can they really choose to do this? If someone is just trying to pick a flavor to eat and they consciously “choose” to get a scoop of cherry ice cream, what will their choice be fundamentally based on? A conscious frame of reference? I don’t think so. The conscious frame of reference is an abbreviated interpretation of the primary unconscious version (the master version).
Their choice will be made primarily by the survival-promoting amygdala in the temporal lobe which created an emotional tag (unconsciously) sometime in the past for the same or similar flavors. If they’ve never had that flavor before, then their choice will be made based on Pro’s vs. Con’s which their unconscious mind catalogs. This is what will motivate the person to get a flavor that they like, rather than some actual conscious “choice” occurring. The “conscious choice” here is really a secondary artifact based on unconscious processes governed by genes, past experiences, and/or random mental anomalies that were out of a person’s control. I will say that there are certain flaws in the conclusions derived from some of these psychological experiments (more certainty than may be warranted) that indicate conscious control as illusory, but I think that fundamentally there is more evidence that suggests this illusion to be true rather than the other way around. Our conscious mind is a way for us to subjectively (not objectively) transcend our automatonic reality but I think one of the main reasons for this transcendence is the conscious mind’s priority of short term (in the moment) perception and proprioception. It doesn’t have an awareness of all the unconscious information needed to better establish it as the “mode” that is in true control. So it truncates and abbreviates this enormous amount of unconscious information into a faster responding albeit secondary form that we perceive as the primary frame of reference (the “me”). This is why we feel that “we” are the masters; simply because “we” don’t have access to that unconscious perspective (the ‘I’), and consciousness is simply what we define as the “me”, even though the ‘I’ or the “seer” is the true master. Since the ‘I’ can not see itself completely (just as Kant suggested years ago, which I agree with), we can not see the unconscious that drives everything above it (such as consciousness).
Peace and love,
-Lage
Michael Gazzaniga:
http://bigthink.com/ideas/42384?utm_source=Big+Think+Weekly+Newsletter+Subscribers&utm_campaign=8230aecccf-Sun_2_12_Auto_Brain2_10_2012&utm_medium=email
Ron
I think that you are missing the point.
The concept of “free will” is different in both ways
Let’s see that.
Ron:Free will is the ability to make choices,actions and decisions without previous events or causes (classical free will)
I agree with you in that.
Klemm:The ability to make choices,decisions and actions With the conscious having a causal (not ephipenomenal) and necessary role. (conscious control)
Do you see that?
If you are going to make a critique about the Bill’s Paper you have to attack the 12 interpretative issues and prove that the experiments show that we don’t have conscious control in our actions plans and decisions. (
thing that is difficult because their experiments have false premises and bill shows that in his paper)
In the topic of religion: if the believing of bill about “free will” is for religion issue that matters little. He uses real experiments and real references in his defense for the “conscious control” you cannot criticize the very heart of his paper (Unless you are a professional neuroscientist/psychologist) even they say that the experiments are simple and “we cannot provide evidence for a causal relationship between the activation of the frontopolar cortex and the decision” (soon et al 2011)
So if you want to make a critique about the paper do it but in the “conscious control” topic, the entire paper not address anything about determinism/underterminism and you will be missing the point of his paper if you only criticize the concept of “free will” that is different that yours.
P.D I saw your blog entry about the flies and his “free will” (also I saw some older comments in this post) I note that you are using the Bill’s religion in a very impressive way, you don’t attack his arguments for the conscious control you are attacking his personal beliefs and his concept of free will. That is an easy target for you huh? The really difficult thing is to prove with evidence that the subconscious governs the action of learning piano or to ride a bicycle as Klemm says in his paper “you can argue that the subconscious causes all those actions….but how do you prove that??”
The Oxford dictionary says this about the ad hominem:
“attacking an opponent’s motives or character rather than the policy or position they maintain”
If you say that the religion conducts Klemm’s belief about free will you are using an ad hominem argument and that matters little in this debates
Alexis,
It’s perfectly legitimate to point out where one’s presuppositions (in this case religious belief) are colouring one’s understanding.
Read this:
http://brainblogger.com/2010/10/25/free-will-is-not-an-illusion/#comment-604823
If you read the main post in the context of the title and this response, how can you not think Bill believes we have free-will? Bill is of course ‘free’ to clarify this, but so far hasn’t. His answer would be relevant to the main post here, though not so much to his paper.
All science presumes causality. Causality can be split into determinism and indeterminism, and each of those has an ontological (what really is the case) and epistemological (the extent to which humans see the case). You cannot get away from this. When science has no clear cut answers, no convincing evidence, then you have to go back to this foundation. The title of this blog is “Free will is NOT and illusion” – the capitalised *NOT* being pretty emphatic. If there is no classical free-will, as you agree, then our feeling that we have it must be an illusion. What else is it?
And, how can we avoid the philosophy when Bill’s paper titles the conclusion “CONCLUDING PHILOSPHICAL PERSPECTIVE”. How much plainer does this have to be?
I happen to agree with a lot of what is in Bill’s paper. A critique is not necessarily going to disagree with what is being critiqued. But more on that later.
Hi Ron
Ok I think that you Can’t really attack the objections about the experiments that bill’s points in his paper (excepts perhaps the introspection issue and the generalization about the experiments,but you tend to agree with Bill’s claims in both)
In religion: unless the objections say that God gave us free will because he loves us and gave us eternal life the objections presented in this post and the paper are valid and compatible with and atheist/agnostic point of view (in fact in the first chapter of his new book “Atoms of mind” he criticizes the use of “sobrenatural” to explain the functions and actions of the brain.)
Ok Let’s talk about philosophy:
If you have read about the philosophical question about if we have free will you maybe found that there are too much concepts used by the philosophers to explain the meaning of “free will”
There are too much concepts for example
“Free will is the ability of agents to make choices free from certain kinds of constraints”
“free will is the ability to make choices,actions or decisions without direct intervention of other entities (God,Satan,other people)”
“Free will is the ability to deliberate about future courses of action and my reasons to choose them,and make plans in the light of this deliberation”
(please note that the third definition is compatible with determinism and with the bill’s objections)
Many definitions are valid for the Philosophical questions about the free will (as you can see both you and bill’s concepts are equally valid) I dont think that you have the only and the most complete definition for “free will” (not at least for philosophers)
Philosophers like Daniel Dennet,Walter glannon,Alfred Mele,Adina roskies and eddy nahmias accept that we have degrees of free will (see the concepts again) even in a deterministic world.
This is one of my points about Bill’s paper.
[where -> links cause to effect]
This is how I see consciousness, and subsequently the illusory natuer of free-will in consciousness.
A) The Caused and Causing Conscious
1) Environment -> Unconscious
2) Unconscious -> Conscious
3) Unconscious+Conscious -> (Unconscious, Conscious, Behaviour, Environment)
i.e. the Conscious has no ‘free’ capacity, since it too is caused. The diagram on p67 of the paper suggests this. The consciousness, and its ‘will’, is caused and is not free. So, free-will is not an appropriate term for it, whereas illusory free-will is an appropriate term.
Bill’s point is based on the illusory free-will (IFW) proponents’ thinking this:
B) The Observer Only Conscious:
1) Environment -> Unconscious
2) Unconscious -> Conscious
3) Unconscious -> (Unconscious, Conscious, Behaviour, Environment)
i.e. the Conscious is caused, but does no causing itself. This seems to be what he’s objecting to, in that it is what Bill claims that the cited people think.
But that’s not the complete story behind Bill’s argument. The IFW proponents, in trying to make the point that the conscious is an observer, are essentially saying that the conscious is caused, as in (A).
Yet Bill is implying, if not stating outright, that not only do IFW proponents hold to (B), but that he thinks something like this is the case:
C) Free-Will Conscious
1) Environment -> Unconscious
2) Unconscious -> Conscious-C
3) Unconscious + Conscious-C + Conscious-F -> (Unconscious, Conscious, Behaviour, Environment)
Where Conscious-C is the caused consciousness that Bill acknowledges, and Conscious-F is the free-will aspects of the conscious mind that Bill seems to hold to, and what I am objecting to.
If Bill can clarify this point it might make the whole issue here clearer.
So, is Bill claiming that the people he cites think (A) or (B), and, which does Bill hold to. Much of his paper would suggest (A), but then some of it, and this post’s title in particular, would suggest (C).
Personally, given that proponents of illusory free-will think that the consciousness is caused I can’t imagine they would seriously think that the consciousness would not also feed back (cause) into the unconscious. If he has interpreted any of them correctly in this then I would disagree with them on that point. The term ‘observer consciousness’ is merely one that is meant to emphasise that the consciousness has no ‘free’ will to instagate causes uncaused – i.e. opposing (C), but agreeing with (A) not (B).
Alexis,
“…unless the objections say that God…”
Stop right there. Anything about God is off the table. This is the point I make about religion. Without any evidence or logical reason to suppose there is a God, and arguments from God are null and void. That’s why I specifically point out that if someones religious belief is persuading them one way or the other then it’s not a good reason to be so persuaded.
“There are too much concepts for example”
Yes, but that’s the fault of compatibilists typically. There is a very clear notion of free-will that is based on dualism. That’s all we need of a free-will definition. Anyone who claims we have free-will and yet rejects dualism needs to be very clear about what the will is free of.
“…please note that the third definition is compatible…”
This is the problem: it turns out that compatibilists re-define free will in such a manner that it no longer means the same as the real meaning and then they claim free-will is compatible with determinism. And, if you read specific compatibilists (Dennett is more fuzzy on this than many compatibilists) you will find that their major motivation is the fear of our rejection of responsibility in the face of determinism.
Some compatibilists make noises such as “Of course we agree with determinism, and of course we don’t have classical free-will, but what really matters is …. how humans behave toward each other … studies show that rejecting free-will increases lack of responsibility … but of course we can make decisions … I could have done otherwise had the conditions been different…”
If asked what flavour ice cream I like and I say vanilla, and when given vanilla I say, “No you don’t understand, I mean the vanilla that’s most important: it’s chocolate coloured and tastes of chocolate.” Then I think you get the point.
“Free will is the ability of agents to make choices free from certain kinds of constraints”
This is precisely the slippery definition I’m talking about. What the heck are ‘certain kinds of constraints’?
“Free will is the ability to deliberate about future courses of action and my reasons to choose them,and make plans in the light of this deliberation”
This is so chock full of free-will language, but each is so caused that after the first two words you can give a deterministic representation that completely removes the correspondence to the first two words.
Ron
That “unless god say” was irony, i am an atheist just like you but being an atheist don´t give you a magical “philosophical or scientifical” intelligence just say that you don´t believe in churches,crosses and God´s that´s all.And again the 12 interpretative issues are compatible with atheism
About the “Free will”:
Bill demonstrates that the experiments who conclude that the conscious is epiphenomenal are silly and flawed, of course that the conscious makes actions and decisions (perhaps no “free” but the conscious clearly controlls much behavior) we don´t know how (completely) the conscioussness work and i think that many people underestimate the role of the conscious.
The scientists (and philosophers) change the meaning of tthe concept free will many times (E.G in one article sam harris say that the conscious is useless and in 3 months later says that “he plays an important role in our (determined) behavior” but if you pay attention i said that many philosophers think that we have “degrees” of free will no complete free will,no nothing free will we have “degrees” they say.Many scientists say that the free will is
In fact the first definition of free will is the one used by determinist philosophers and scientists the “certain kinds of constraints” vary in each person.
About the ice cream example,i think that is flawed, vanilla is one thing and chocolate another,it´s too more difficult to define free will,conscious and unconscious even professionals cannot not reach an agreement on the definition of free will first tell me what is the “correct” definition of free will and then we can discuss that.(i think that you agree with me that even in a deterministic universe we can make choices,decisions and actions controlled by the conscious and planning them to the future,correct me if you don´t agree)
You are right in some points,the nature programs the unconscious and the unconscious programs the conscious, (of course the conscious can program and feedback the unconscious too).
P.D I think that we agree in the point that the conscious is not epiphenomenal and the 12 interpretative issues (although they can´t provide evidence for real and unlimited “free will”) they destroy the present neuroscientific evidence against total unconscious control,the debate is going on physics and philosophy let´s take away the topic of neuroscience,unless you have another thing to say….that´s okay for you?
Alexis,
Regarding your comment which says:
“About the ice cream example,i think that is flawed, vanilla is one thing and chocolate another,it´s too more difficult to define free will,conscious and unconscious even professionals cannot not reach an agreement on the definition of free will first tell me what is the “correct” definition of free will and then we can discuss that.(i think that you agree with me that even in a deterministic universe we can make choices,decisions and actions controlled by the conscious and planning them to the future,correct me if you don´t agree)”
I’m not sure what exactly is flawed with my “ice cream” thought experiment, and I’m unclear what your point was when you said “vanilla is one thing and chocolate another”? Can you elaborate? I merely pointed out that your amygdala and unconscious processes will make the choice for you, and pass the information/preference to your conscious mind (i.e. an abbreviated secondary reference frame).
Then you said “i think that you agree with me that even in a deterministic universe we can make choices,decisions and actions controlled by the conscious and planning them to the future,correct me if you don´t agree”
I don’t believe that we can make any true choices at all in a deterministic universe, nor plan anything with a free will, period. You, previously claiming to be an incompatibilist should agree. If you are redefining the “illusion of choice” and just calling it “choice”, then I agree with you. We do have an “illusion of choice” which we could conveniently label as “choice”, but it is not true choice.
As for future planning, if we ignore the concept of free will and just focus on conscious involvement (even if it’s not free), it appears that we use our frontal cortex for this type of processing, but it is still unclear what role our conscious mind has in this planning (if any at all). Our conscious mind may feel that it’s doing all the planning, but is it? I believe it is controlled in an unconscious manner, at least fundamentally. I believe that there are zero degrees of freedom when it comes to free will. The universe may have freedom due to quantum randomness, but it in no way gives us any degree of freedom.
Peace and love,
-Lage
Lage.
I think that you are making many (not all) assumptions from the wrong point of view that the introspection makes.
as you can see in my response to Ron we cannot fully understand the conscious,we know that the unconscious plays and important and valuable place in our behavior,but the assumptions or experiments of many people that suggest that the conscious is of minor importance,is ephiphenomenal or plays only an indirect causal role in our behavior are using flawed arguments (first they believe that the Libet´s experiments are true,and they say that the conscious can only be studied by the “conscious awareness” of the subject.) i think that the conscious plays a very important role in our behavior. as Klemm says the unconscious program the conscious and vice versa (the issue of the “free” programming is other topic) both conscious and unconscious control and feedback each other the minimalist role for the conscious is only supported by the silly experiments of Haynes and others and the “theory of mental causation” of psychologists like Daniel M Wegner. there are no evidence for minimal or epiphenomenal conscious control of behavior.
Lage
I think that the system didn´t published your comment (i received a notification on my iphone about your comment) please write it again.
Lage
(i´m pretty sure that Ron make the claims that you are using for example the ice cream example,i dont know who´s really debating with me)
You say “I think that the unconscious makes our decisions”
but where´s the evidence for that? i don´t know of any REAL evidence for unconscious total control,again the only ones are the fMRI experiments and the theory of mental causation,both have flawed arguments.
Even in a deterministic lacking free will universe that does´nt show that our unconscious makes decisions and actions before we are aware of.no evidence for that.on the other hand there are plenty evidence for conscious control of behavior.
(see the book “do conscioussnes cause behavior?, the experiments of Baumeister et al,some experiments suggest that the conscious makes better and faster decisions that the unconscious)
so even in a deterministic world the consciousness is not ephiphenomenal,maybe less effective than we really know but clearly is not useless.
P.D:im still waiting for evidence supporting the hypothesis of “the unconscious governs all our mental life”
The point of the ice cream analogy was to give a more obvious example of how the compatibilist argument fails. By changing the definition of what I think is vanilla (“No you don’t understand, I mean the vanilla that’s most important: it’s chocolate coloured..”) is obviously unjustified. Compatibilists, by switching the definition of free-will, are claiming that this different definition of free will is compatible with determinism – well so what.
Until compatibilists started changing the definition the definition of free-will always was about some method by which the will is free of deterministic causes. It’s about as useless switch of meaning as my re-defining vanilla in terms of chocolate and still calling it vanilla. Compatibilist free-will is not regular vanilla free will that is free of causes, so why call if free-will?
Why not just say, OK, free-will is an illusion, but we’re interested in this other thing that isn’t free-will. We’re interested in living with the illusion and talking about freedom in that context. Why the insistence on defending free-will against the claim that it is illusory, which is what the title of this post does.
But if we don´t have free will (again i´m not a compatibilist) how we can ensure moral and legal responsibility? (the only thing that comes in mind are the Gazzaniga´s proposals (see that here) in where he says “The issue isn’t whether we are ‘free,’” “The issue is that there is no scientific reason not to hold people accountable and responsible.”
but how do you said that?? (please also note that he bases all his assupmtions in the flawed experiments) if we dont have free will for some things (call it for example,Unconscious decisions or deterministic universe) how we can have moral responsibility that you and Lage say? i dont understand if i kill a man with a gun why i´m responsible for that?
Clear that Ron
P.D Lage i´m still waiting for evidence supporting the “Dictatorship of the unconscious”
Alexis,
I wanted to respond to your moral responsibility question. I don’t believe that we have moral responsibility as our thoughts and actions are a part of a causal chain that we had no control over, or are a result of quantum randomness which we have no control over. Most people that live in a society agree with the idea of moral responsibility, but the reality is, our morals themselves could have been different if the causal chain that led up to the creation of them was different (or the quantum randomness took a different random turn). The only reason we imprison people that kill others, is because we’ve been indoctrinated to do so. The only reason that imprisoned person may have killed someone is because they were indoctrinated to do so. There is no moral responsibility. The universe just “is what it is”. We have no free control over our actions — it is all either predetermined or random. The trouble is that we live in a world where the “illusion of free will” exists and thus we have an “illusion of moral responsibility” but like “free will”, it is also an illusion. We aren’t separate beings and we aren’t objective observers in this universe. We are inextricably linked to the whole and thus our “separateness” and “self” is also an illusion. I tend to think of each “one of us” as an illusory compartment of consciousness, when really everything is one unit in the universe. It just “is what it is”. Quantum physics has been demonstrating this for years, as well as Eastern mysticism. So I believe based on the evidence around us and the very tenets of science itself, that moral responsibility does not really exist. Yes, we are responsible in the sense that we are a part of the causal chain that led to an action — but we are no more responsible for that action than every other bit of matter in the universe. We can try to grade the degree of concentrated causality or localized causality to an individual person over a seemingly unrelated constituent of the universe, but it is an arbitrary distinction based on the illusion of separateness and the illusion of a “self”.
As for evidence supporting the “dictatorship of the unconscious”, I believe that because our brain undergoes processing before we perceive something, or before we have a thought — we must realize that those processes and chemical reactions are happening outside of our conscious awareness and thus over-rule the subsequent result in our consciousness. The fact that we only use a fraction of our brain during consciousness, compared to all of these other automated processes and unconscious processes, at the very least we must agree that the unconscious and/or non-conscious brain are the majority of all brain activity. I believe that these experiments that measure brain activity before the participants sense the result is adequate evidence in support of this idea. The fact that there is a delay between this brain activity and conscious thought implies that it is prior. If you want to negate the timing accuracy of the individual due to introspection, then you have to negate all consciousness induced data points. You can’t have it both ways, and I think that this is one flaw in Klemm’s rebuttal.
Peace and love,
-Lagius
“But if we don´t have free will how we can ensure moral and legal responsibility?”
I’ll get back to how we can have legal responsibility shortly. For now I want to repeat my point about the failure in logic here. Let’s suppose for the moment that we have this set of consequences:
1) Determinism => No free-will (=> means implies)
2) No free-will => No Responsibility (this is the bit I’ll get back to)
3) Determinism => No Responsibility (by 1 and 2)
That’s it! Wanting to ‘ensure’ we have responsibility doesn’t come into it. You cannot change the argument to this:
1) Determinism => No free-will (=> means implies)
2) No free-will => No Responsibility (this is the bit I’ll get back to)
3) Determinism => No Responsibility (by 1 and 2)
4) We want responsibility, so that we can apply morals and law.
5) Therefore, from 4, it must be that 3,2,1 are false.
This is arguing from desire rather than fact.
One approach is to say, well, we must throw out all concepts of responsibility, morality, etc. Anythin goes. We are heading for moral nihilism!
This is the tactic of the religious and many compatibilists who dread the loss of their moral systems. But, they are misunderstanding teh determinist case.
The causal nature of responsibility:
Even in a deterministic system there is a sense in which some causes are localised in time and space, even though they have ultimate causes in common with everything else.
Start by setting up a scenario that has no humans involved, so there’s no temptation to say “Ah, but human intention set that up” (which could be the case with a billiard ball example).
Imagine an earth quake Q1 causes 26 fist sized rocks to roll down a hill and come to rest on the slop in a particular area, and label these rocks A to Z. Clearly the causal consequences of this event go back to the earth quake Q1, and before that the loose location of the rocks before being disturbed, the weathering and prior quakes that set them there, back to the formation of the mountain, back to tectonic plate movement, …, back to the formation of the earth, …, solar system, …, big bang, … ???
Now, another earth quake Q2 occurs (with some of the same causal antecedents as Q1) disturbing only rocks A to D further. Rock A rolls down the hill and kills a deer, while rocks B,C,D stop harmlessly short. Only rock A was the local and immediate cause of the death of the deer. The other rocks clearly did not cause the death of the deer. Can we say the last quake Q2 caused the deer to be killed? Well, that quake caused several other rocks to fall too, but only rock A killed the deer. The prior quake Q1 that disturbed A to Z caused A to be in a position that would permit (un-constrain) the last quake Q2 to cause A to kill the deer. The weathering that loosened the rocks caused them to be in positions that would permit quake Q1 and then quake Q2 to cause A to kill the deer. And so on.
There is still this local, in time and space, sense that A killed the deer. But can we ‘blame’ rock A, hold it ‘responsible’? We tend not to, when thinking rationally, but how often do we blame inanimate objects for problems. We’re used to looking deeper into the causal chains when it comes to inanimate objects, but because we have developed this separate special notion of humans, and because for all our history the brain has been inaccessible to us, we always stop our search for causal sources with the human brain-body system.
But in a deterministic sense we can still localise the causal source of any human activity. Some examples:
a) If a rock falls on my foot I will leap in pain, or might even leap to avoid it if I see it soon enough. This is an automatic response. I don’t think anyone would suggest I used my free-will to leap, in pain or in avoidance.
b) If I see the rock start to fall, say ten seconds before it reaches me I see it coming, and can take evasive action – maybe deciding to hide behind a nearby massive bolder. Because my conscious mind has had time to contemplate the motion of the rock we have a tendency to say I used my free-will to avoid it. But really this isn’t much different from a machine predicting and taking action. So even here, for me, the causal chains are still present: the rock triggers survival behaviour which is ‘programmed’ into most animals; and evolution has caused humans to have brains that can predict and ‘decide’ to act….
Here’s a deterministic description of that last sentence: Our brains are caused, by brain biology, to acquire patterns in brain states that map to causal consequences such that there is a reasonable correspondence between what will happen and what these patterns represent – we ‘estimate’ the future, we don’t ‘see’ it in any future site spooky sense. The patterns in our brains are caused just as much as the patterns of actuality they predict. And, our brains tend to follow a path of least resistance, that is they are caused to do so, that results in the brain causing (deciding) actual subsequent behaviour. That the brain has several ‘possible’ ‘choices’ available is merely an expression of the fact that several patterns of predictive behaviour are present in the brain, so it seems like we have options, that we could have chosen otherwise; but all the time, whichever is the least resistant causal path is the one that plays out in the causal physics of the brain. We can’t know which path the brain will take. Sometimes brains seem to take the least obvious path to us (deciding to go out in the freezing conditions without protective clothing; thinking we can get away with a murder, …) – but that is really down to the fact that the brain doesn’t have sufficient data, it’s patterns of prediction are ‘biased’, or ‘uniformed’; which is to say our epistemological acuity doesn’t match the deterministic ontological actuality (we do sometimes freeze, we do sometimes get caught, …).
c) If I have sufficient prior causes my brain may get into a state where it predicts some unfortunate future, say someone is going to reveal that I was involved in a bank robbery. Another alternative prediction show this will be prevented if he dies. Another prediction shows he will be sure of dying if I kill him. … and so goes the causal sequences that result in what we would call premeditated murder.
In each of the above cases, a,b,c there is a real deterministic sense in which the causes of some action is focused on the human being with greater degree of localisation of time and space. This is the sense in which we can attribute deterministic cause to an individual. We can say a human is ‘responsible’ for the cause of some action, their action, by virtue of the degree to which that individual is the localisation of the cause.
This makes sense in terms of current morals and law. An immediate act of killing in self-defence is considered less culpable than a premeditated one. And if my automatic leap to avoid a falling rock (a) caused me to knock another person over the cliff we would call this an accident. Our current interpretation of free-will is already accounting for the localisation in time and space of our actions.
This also applies to someone who is mentally ill and who kills because they feel that they are being attacked when they are not. We say they are ‘responsible’ for the death, but that the causes of their state of mind mitigate against the degree of that responsibility.
But in both cases of premeditated murder and mental illness we still incarcerate for the very pragmatic reason that we recognise the causal consequences of not doing: they may kill again – the causal determinants that caused them to kill persist and remain localised in their brains.
The point here, from the determinist perspective, is that we acknowledge the complexity of causal consequences. So, we do not jail people to punish them for reasons of retribution, but because we know incarceration can cause a change of behaviour, if accompanied by the right psychological help – this is a real physical change to the brain we are looking for, with the real causal consequences that they will not kill again upon release.
What is inexcusable is to incarcerate without proper treatment, which leads to further alienation and re-offending – which is often the incarceration of choice made by those with a commitment to the notion of free-will, who ‘blame’ the individual and think they don’t deserve help to change, that they must ‘choose’ to change themselves.
So, we can account for responsibility, in law, in a real pragmatic way. And, this approach has a better chance of being informed by science that does any metaphysical notion of free-will that has no evidence to support it. And it avoids the nasty retributive concepts that come from thinking people always have the free-will to change, and that they just have to want to change, and if they don’t then that’s their fault too.
What we can also recognise, under determinism, is that even though free-will does not exist, it is a powerful illusion that we find difficult, if not impossible, to shake off. This is saying no more than the illusion that the sun moves round the earth and ‘rises’ and ‘sets’ is a convincing illusion when we are watching sun rises and sun sets. I have actually watched sun rises and sun sets and tried to imagine the revolving earth rather than the moving sun; so this latter illusion, being about objects like the earth and sun is easier to overcome. The free-will illusion is so ingrained within our psyche that it is more persistent – but we can still use reason to look beyond it.
But for every day life, when we’re not worrying too much about life and death, incarceration, law, then it is fine to use the free-will model that we are used to using. I suffer no cognitive dissonance in saying that I have chosen to write this response, even though I know I have been caused, compelled, to do it because my brain is reacting to the patterns caused in it by this post and subsequent comments, and by all my prior opinions (brain states, patterns) representing my views on science and philosophy. And of course all this is causal and dynamic. I’ve been asked, “Why bother with this argument – you are caused to think what you think and I’me caused to think what I think.” Well, yes, but this misses the extent of causality’s reach. It is quite within the bounds of causality for something you write to cause a change in my brain patterns, or something I write might cause a change in yours. And it also misses the point that if we are caused to have this conversation then we will have it, whether we change each others mind or not.
I think that if we are determined completely by previous events we don´t have moral and legal responsibility.that would be like blaming a pinball ball colliding with the triggers (changing ball for person)
At the unconscious:
There´s evidence for unconscious neuronal firing,but that´s no evidence for the “unconscious dictatorship” clearly much of our behavior is controlled by unconcious processes but not all.The experiments with fMRI measure unconscious neuronal patterns but the researchears can´t say that these processes represent a final decision.
” we don´t have moral responsibility …that would be like blaming a pinball ball…”
You’re starting to get it. Moral responsibility is just our phrasing, in human free-will model terms, of how human brains have patterns that match the behaviour of humans. There’s a ‘nice’ pattern for good stuff and a ‘bad’ pattern for bad stuff. The different patterns cause different responses.
“…we don´t have legal responsibility…”
In nature, you’re right, we don’t. There is no ‘natural law’ regarding behaviour. Animals (including humans) just do what they do. But, human animals concoct (their brains are caused to invent) social restraints on behaviour that, to some extent, correspond to the ‘moral’ patterns that evolution has caused us to experience.
“clearly much of our behavior is controlled by unconcious processes but not all.”
So, from my earlier examples, are you saying that you think (A) or (C) is the case? Because it now sounds like you’re saying (C), and that you do think we have free-will.
A) The Caused and Causing Conscious
1) Environment -> Unconscious
2) Unconscious -> Conscious
3) Unconscious+Conscious -> (Unconscious, Conscious, Behaviour, Environment)
C) Free-Will Conscious
1) Environment -> Unconscious
2) Unconscious -> Conscious-C
3) Unconscious + Conscious-C + Conscious-F -> (Unconscious, Conscious, Behaviour, Environment)
Where “…much of our behavior (Conscious-C) is controlled by unconcious processes but not all (Conscious-F)”
(Ron i received a notification for your response on my mail)
My last post was principally to lage and his hipotesis about “unconscious dictatorship”
My point of “much of our behavior is unconscious but not all that´s for emphasize that our unconscious not do all the work choosing our plans actions and decisions without conscious (big) relevance in these matters.
I know that the unconscious creates the conscious but the unconscious doesn´t have a dictatorship over the conscious. for example if our unconscious says that he wants to use drugs the conscious can say NO! i don´t want that!! (at least in many cases) thats not the same if the unconscious says Do that and you even doesn´t know why you are doing that (unconscious dictatorship).
So yes the unconscious and conscious are not “free” but the unconscious alone doesn´t have the last word in our decisions.
Again that´s especially for Lage response about that.
Alexis,
I believe that the unconscious does have the last word, ultimately. If our conscious processes are a by-product of, or determined by hard-wiring of the unconscious, then once again, what we perceive as a distinct decision making entity (conscious) is really just a secondary artifact, even if it is the only “mind” that we perceive.
If we are to believe in a causal universe, then something had to cause the conscious thought? What might that be? It can’t be self-caused, so there had to be something that caused it. The only causes that come to mind (generally) are genes, programming, and quantum randomness. These causes are out of conscious control. Unless you think you can consciously change your genes, or consciously change your programming. If you can’t consciously change these things, then the conscious mind is a secondary artifact stemming from these causes. If the conscious mind can’t control the programming, then it must be the unconscious mind that controls this programming or is the ultimate source of it, based on genetic limitations and the environmental experiences accrued over the lifetime of the individual. So while I believe that the conscious mind is a part of the causal chain stemming from the unconscious, and while I believe that the conscious mind does have a role in executing actions and thoughts based on unconscious limitations and instructions, I don’t believe it has any final say in what the decision is (unless one says that the conscious mind’s final interpretation of the unconscious instructions/decision is somehow a “final say”). I believe that the conscious mind interprets those unconscious instructions/decisions in a way that still allows it to perform its job (our ability to interact with the outside world with a useful concept of reality that allows us to survive), but I don’t believe it makes any final decisions. These decisions were ultimately predetermined by the unconscious (even if a feedback loop is occurring between the conscious mind and the unconscious mind) and it becomes an abbreviated secondary form when entering the conscious realm. It is an “after thought” because it is a result of programming that we are not consciously able to control or aware of. We aren’t aware of this programming that “causes” us to make these decisions (we don’t perceive this programming, even though we talk about it’s existence), so we can’t consciously control this programming and thus the final decisions can’t be made consciously. If some decision is made that truly violates the unconscious instructions, then I believe that it is a result of quantum randomness which is still out of our control.
Peace and love,
-Lage
Lage
Again where´s the evidence for that? introspection?
One thing is to say that the environment programs (determines) our unconscious (i agree with that) and other completely different is to say that the unconscious completely overrides the conscious process. and yes too much behavior relies on unconscious process (E.g walking is often an unconscious process) but to say that the unconscious completely decides where to go or what to say is nonsense!!! if the unconcious worked in that form we never (or at least at minimum) know why we decided that or another option.
E.G if you consciously deliberate about buying a house or a car the unconscious reasons for that decisions certainly not correspond to the conscious reason for deciding one option.
so where´s the evidence for that Lage?
P.D:Please don´t say that the “determinist universe” is evidence for unconscious dictatorship…..determinism doesn´t matter about this issues.
Alexis,
Where’s the evidence to refute this hypothesis of mine?
You said that “the environment programs (determines) our unconscious (i agree with that)”.
So if the unconscious is already programmed, then how can the conscious decide to do anything?
The logical answer would be that it decides what to do based on the unconscious programming. If not, then what would allow the conscious to make a decision? Where would the conscious mind get it’s instructions from? It can’t pull them out of thin air, so there has to be a causal source for them. We are products of our environment, which means that we are programmed to make the decisions that we make. If the unconscious is the “mind” that is programmed (which you said you agree with), then the unconscious is what makes the decisions, since the other “mind” (conscious) is not programmed. What part of this doesn’t make sense to you?
As I said before, I do believe that the conscious mind could play a role in executing the decision (made by the unconscious), but it is getting it’s instructions from somewhere — and I see the unconscious mind as the most likely source of these instructions, thus the conscious is not the source of the final decision. If this isn’t the source of instructions, then what is? Itself? It can’t be self-caused.
We feel that we know why we decide what we decide, because our unconscious (most of the time) relays the reasons for the decision. We are consciously “aware” of our rationale, even though this rationale is unconsciously programmed. Programming is something dedicated to the unconscious. If you think otherwise, then say so — and explain why. We don’t consciously feel this programming, and introspection is really the only interface with our conscious mind. If introspection is invalid as evidence, then what evidence do you have to refute my hypothesis? We can assume that any processes that aren’t handled by the conscious mind are handled by the unconscious, so whatever we perceive or think about consciously is all we have to work with to confirm that it is indeed consciousness. So by process of elimination, we can assume that anything we are not conscious of, including our programming, is unconsciously controlled. If we were conscious of our specific programming, then you’d think we’d have the knowledge to change it. That doesn’t seem to be the case. If you think that the conscious mind is also programmed, then what evidence do you have to support that claim? Introspection is the key method to study our consciousness — even if it may be subjective. Consciousness is subjective, that’s the whole point. If consciousness is subjective, then the only way to study it completely is with subjective evidence — that is, through introspection.
It is reasonable to assume that things that we don’t think about or are not conscious of, must either not exist, or they must be processes operating on the unconscious level (by process of elimination). So again I repeat, if we aren’t conscious of our programming — since we are bound by it and have an illusion of free will, then it must be unconsciously controlled, if this programming exists. If our decisions are made by this programming, then it must be the unconscious responsible for this final decision. Is this not enough evidence? If not, explain why not? Explain to me how you can have your cake and eat it too.
Peace and love,
-Lage
Lage
How do you know that these unconscious ideas,thoughts or biases don´t have a conscious controlling part? you are using only introspection to support your ideas.
In fact the conscious plays a major role in our behavior, check out this article:http://carlsonschool.umn.edu/assets/165663.pdf
P.D:The researchers say that the conscious only serves to play an indirect an delayed causal role,but these assumptions are supported only by the flawed experiments that Klemm criticizes (and introspection) so the conscious is very important for our behavior , i think that the conscious is sometimes understimated.
Clearly the conscious mind is determined (not free) but there´s a big difference between a conscious decision and an unconscious truly Zombian decision.
Alexis,
You still never answered my questions. If it is the unconscious “mind” that is programmed, and you agree that the conscious mind is determined, then how can the conscious mind make a decision? Where does the conscious mind get it’s instructions from to “make a decision”? If it gets it from the unconscious, then it is really the unconscious making the decision. If not, then how do you suppose the conscious mind makes a decision? Where does the conscious mind get it’s instructions to make this “decision”? Are you saying that you believe that the conscious mind is also programmed, separately from the unconscious? If we have this illusion of free will, consciously, then we don’t consciously perceive this programming. Can we really call it conscious programming if we aren’t conscious of it?
If we can’t, then it must be programming sent from the unconscious mind, as the unconscious encompasses all brain processes that are not controlled by the conscious mind. Explain what you don’t understand about my response.
If I program a computer (#1) to program another computer (#2), and the second computer is relying on instructions from the first one, then does the second computer ever really make a choice independent of that first computer’s code? I don’t think so. How is this any different than the conscious mind being controlled by the unconscious mind? While the conscious mind feels independent as the causes of our actions and thoughts, isn’t this all really originating from brain processes that we are not conscious of? We might have a problem once again with semantics and definitions here. If the conscious mind is ultimately controlled by a programmed unconscious mind, then can the conscious mind ever really make it’s own decision? One can argue that it makes a decision, but if it is based on the unconscious programming, then the “decision” that it makes loses meaning and is not independent of the “instructor” (unconscious).
In the article that you listed above, it was mentioned that all behavior seems to be caused from an interplay between conscious and unconscious processes. My hypothesis is that this interplay is really one controlling the other, and it’s because it comes down to how we define the two. Shouldn’t we define consciousness as the frame of mind that gives us awareness and anything at all that we are conscious of? Are we conscious of conscious programming? If not, then it’s not conscious programming — and if the programming exists, then it must be unconscious — and thus the true decider.
As I mentioned several times over in previous posts, I acknowledge the role that the conscious mind plays in executing or perceiving a decision made. I think where we differ here is how we define consciousness and/or how we define a decision. As in my computer example above, where do you draw the line between the programmer and the programmed? If I program a computer to “choose” apples over oranges, then who or what makes the decision? Is it the computer or the programmer? Is it one algorithm that makes the choice? Is it a transistor? Is it electrons? One could argue that the computer “made a decision” based on instructions from the programmer, but did it really decide or choose anything? Or was it the programmer all along, who chose or decided that he wanted this computer to “choose” apples over oranges? Back to the problem of nomenclature, can we “choose” anything if there really is no choice? If the computer is just an agent representing the programmer’s preference of apples over oranges, then it doesn’t really choose anything itself. This is my point when it comes to the unconscious mind. I don’t think, if the conscious mind gets instructions from a programmed unconscious, that it can make a true decision. If we want to still say that it’s making a decision, then it’s like the computer “choosing” apples over oranges — the “decision” or “choice” loses meaning and then we’re back to square one.
Peace and love,
-Lage
P.D2 the only support for “truly and ultimate Free will” that Klemm seems to endorse is the title of this paper (probably for a flawed concept of what free will means)
as Ron says Klemm is suggesting the “causal conscious” in his paper, with no free will but neither under an unconscious dictatorship. so let´s resume this debate.
A):Perhaps Klemm uses a flawed concept of “Free will” (metaphysical) but that concept does not undermine his defense of “conscious causal control”
B:The universe is deterministic so we don´t have truly free will (at least the classical concept of “unlimited and total free will”)
C:There´s no good evidence for that “unconscious dictatorship” the only “evidence” are coming by the unreliable introspection
D:Maybe we have a degree of moral or legal responsibility in a lacking free will world (i don´t fully understand this point)
Another point to say?
Lage
I think that you don´t fully understand the issue,Ron explains it clearly above.
yes the unconscious programs the conscious and both adre programmed by the environment but you dont recognize that the conscious programs too.You are confusing determinism with minimalist conscious
(UnconsciousConscious)(Environment)
In your analogy.
Environment (The programmer)
Environment programs PC1 (unconscious) and the PC1 programs PC2
(conscious)
But the conscious can program the unconscious too,our behavior is not a one way exit.
In my analogy (and the ron´s too)
Environment programs PC1 and the PC1 programs PC2
But the environment can program PC2 to program PC1 too
Do you see that? Both the conscious and unconscious are determined by the environment (they are not free) but our behavior is not fully programed by the unconscious,the conscious can program the unconscious too.Again our behavior in not a one way exit.Both feedback and program each other.And they can change the environment too (obviously with limitations).
So they are independent? No i think that there´s no “free” in the universe (determinism)both unconscious and conscious are determined by other things
But the unconscious completely drives the conscious? Again No both feedback,control and program each other,there´s nonsense to say that the conscious is only a puppet for the unconscious.
Alexis,
What evidence do you have that the conscious mind programs the unconscious as opposed to the unconscious being the only thing that is programmed (“dictatorship” that I propose)?
Peace and love,
-Lage
Lage
Check out this (interesting) article is very informative and shows that the neuroscience is actually inaccurate to test the free will problem.
http://moreintelligentlife.com/content/ideas/neurons-v-free-will
And about psychology perhaps concludes that we act based in unconscious reasons (sometimes) but doesn´t say that the conscious is epiphenomenal or of minimum impact.
The evidence for “unconscious dictatorship” is flawed and inaccurate,the evidence for conscious causation of behavior is strong and empirically demonstrated.
Lage,
From your referenced piece:
“This is because many of the distinctively human things that people do take place over time and outside their craniums. Perhaps the brain is the wrong place to look if you want to find free will.”
…
“Raymond Tallis, a retired British doctor and neuroscientist. As Dr Tallis puts it in his “Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity”, trying to find human life in the brain is like trying to hear the rustle of a forest by listening to a seed.”
Tallis is driven by fears. Like Dan Dennett, the compatibilist, he fears that the plebs will become unruly if they learn that their free-will is illusory. But it doesn’t seem like good philosophy to reject an idea because you don’t like its consequences. Tallis dislikes ‘Neuromania’ because it challenges our humanity, according to him. He also dislikes the notion that we are animals. He accepts the principles of evolution, but insists that we are above the animals – that good old religious specialness of humans.
I’ve got the book, Aping Mankind. Tallis does not make a good case at all. He misrepresents the physicalist case.
To emphasise again the case against free-will. All the genetic background that influences the development of the brain, and the brains developmental response to its environment, including the intense learning that goes on, all amount to a physical organ behaving naturally. There is no room for the will to be free. What there is amounts to a localised behavioural system that has some degree of autonomy. The that organism, because it can’t detect through introspection its own physical nature, it seems to it, it feels like it is acting independent of its physical self. The will appears free, from subjective perspective. This is the illusory nature of ‘free-will’.
“As well as casting illumination in what is sometimes the wrong place, today’s scanners are still rather dim streetlights.”
This is true. But that doesn’t completely nullify what they show: that the only evidence for what consciousness is is demonstrating physical source – the brain. Just because the data is still tentative in explaining the detail it doesn’t mean that this is evidence for the panpsychic case.
“This fact is nicely illustrated by Dr Tallis’s discussion of a series of experiments that have been widely taken to undermine the notion of free will. In the 1980s, the late Benjamin Libet…”
But this is old hat. There are later experiments that show delays between act and conscious awareness. But even so, this detail is only one more sense in which science is showing the physical work of the brain.
One point to take from this is that the physical brain is what is doing all the work that we understand as consciousness. The physical processes that lead to the brain doing stuff leave no evidence for anything additional, anything ‘free’ of physical brain activity. Neither Tallis of anyone else ever provide evidence to demonstrate that the ‘mind’ exists as anything other than processes of the brain. There remains no good reason to suppose our will is ‘free’ in any real sense.
So, Lage, “The evidence for “unconscious dictatorship” is flawed and inaccurate”
The ‘unconscious dictatorship’ isn’t really challenged. This is why opponents are still making arguments that are essentially those of the dualist, even while claiming they are not; or they are proposing totally unevidenced ridiculous claims about some mystical consciousness driving everything…
“…the evidence for conscious causation of behaviour is strong and empirically demonstrated.”
What? That some specific claims made from fMRI data is being scrutinised and questioned, you think that means that the panpsychic case is made? It does not follow. You have zero evidence for your case. None. You even admit it, in our comments exchange here: http://nwrickert.wordpress.com/2012/09/16/ways-of-knowing/. There you do list some assertions that you try to link together as ‘reasons’, but there your use of the term ‘reasons’ really just amounts to an explanation for you holding your view and has nothing that resembles a reasoned argument.
Ron,
Umm..what are you responding to or asking exactly? You haven’t made a comment on this blog for quite a while. The comments you quoted were not mine. Was this some error on your part, Ron? This is a blog post on free will. Did you want to continue to talk about free will? We were in large agreement on this issue, so I don’t believe there was much left to debate regarding the issue of free will. I’m an illusionist and I believe that you are as well.
Peace and Love,
-Lage
I quoted from the link you gave. It refers to Tallis in his position on free-will. I first responded to that.
Then you used that link to imply that some objections to Libet are sufficient to make your case.
Lage,
Quite right. Apologies. It was Alexis that posted. I should stop trying to respond from a mobile.
Ron,
No biggie. Simple mistake. There’s a lot of nested comments on this blog and that makes it easier to confuse one comment for another. Keep on keepin’ on!
Peace and love!
-Lage
For those that don’t have the book, Moral Landscape, by Sam Harris, these audio segments cover his view of free-will well, and also go on the discuss the implications for morality:
http://youtu.be/dodTNPp12rg
http://youtu.be/w6oWft4mD10
http://youtu.be/NHEryas3ByA
My optimistic take on the issue – On physics, non-epiphenomenal consciousness and free will:
http://informationvoyeur.blogspot.co.uk/2012/12/on-physics-non-epiphenomenal.html
Matt
Professor Klemm relies upon the false premise that because Libet’s experiments do not demonstrate the non-existence of free will, that therefore free will must exist. Despite this fact, he does not state the basis for his assumption that free will has any meaning whatsoever.
In reality, the problem with free will is that it is both undefinable and implausible. I have yet to be informed of a realistic means by which a will can be “free” of anything, particularly the constraints of the causal laws which guide how our brains function. This is the core criticism of free will, held by neuroscientists and philosophers alike. Rather than addressing this argument, Dr. Klemm completely ignores it.
I’ve made a longer criticism of Klemm’s point here: http://neuroautomaton.com/?p=272.
Cheers
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Why do determinists if they are so convinced of it even bother sharing it? Even if they were right why is it so important for them to destroy all meaning and value like that?
If determinism is true it’s a truth that’s not worth knowing. It’s a truth that makes everything meaningless, valueless.
How do we know the observer effect didn’t impact the experiment by influencing subjects on the quantum level?
Or more likely how do we know that maybe because it’s just an experiment people don’t bother to engage free will because they don’t really care, perhaps people are capable of turning free will on and off but typically leave this to what ever their attitude is about the thing in question. So do I study to be a scientist, politician, doctor, or lawyer, free will activated, in fact activated and reactivated many times though at times I may make expressions of preference on autopilot as I become more confident in my answer. Do I move my body to X position or Y position, the choice is meaningless so free will doesn’t get activated because it has no meaning to me.
I enjoy autopilot from time to time but life is meaningless without effort, without making something real. If free will isn’t real then effort isn’t real either.
I used to be a determinist and that was the most depressing time in my life ever. I am so glad I’m over it.
If determinism were strictly true, then everything would be determined, including the fact that determinists MUST then argue for determinism; and it would be determined that you MUST not believe it, if you don’t. And, should you change your mind, then that would have been determined to. And, it would be determined that determinists CANNOT fnd the world meaningless, because it is determined that their brains do not.
But, you mistake the usefulness of the concept of determinism, as used in this argument about free will. Its real use is as follows:
We humans cannot tell if the world is determined or not. We have limeited knowledge, limited access to knowledge, about how the universe really works. Our theories and experiments are contingent, the best we can do. It looks deterministic, from classical physics. But then quantum physics introduces a greater puzzle. But what we can’t tell is whether the quantum stuff, though apparently random, is itself determined or not. If random events have no determining causes, then they are uncaused causes? What does that mean? We rely on the notion of causality, because that’s how the world appears to work, but we don’t really understand it. Related to causality is time, because for one thing to cause another it seems to have to precede it in time, the causer is at first not causing some event, then at some point in time it causes the event. But fundamental physics is not dependent in time the way we appear to be.
So, with all that, we are not in a position to make claims about ultimate reality. And so, IF determinism is true, or IF there is some randomness, or IF there is some other non-causal interpretation of reality, then where is free will in all this?
All known science has no room for and no evidence for free will. But it does have room for the idea that free will is an illusion, where our inability to sense our own neurons doing the work that we feel is ‘thinking’ makes if feel to us, as individuals, as if our willed thoughts come out of nowhere, free of physical cause. And there is plenty of evidence to show that often, we can demonstrate that what a person thinks was a free willed choice was not.
There is simply no positive evidence or argument for free will. There’s only the personal feeling that we have it. It is only by each of us reporting this personal feeling that we see others have it too. Free will is a convenient model, possibly and evolved brain behaviour, that was generally a more efficient model for early brains to use, and even an efficient model now.
But just like other illusions, such as the sun moving across our sky, those that think free will is an illusion can enjoy its convenience just as much as we enjoy a sunset and sunrise. Knowing that the earth is revolving in front of the sun does not detract from the beauty of the sunrise, but can actually enhance it. See Feynman’s ode to a flower.
“life is meaningless without effort, without making something real.” – We make our own meaning, and make our own effort. If it turns out determinism is true then we have no choice in that matter.
“I used to be a determinist and that was the most depressing time in my life ever. I am so glad I’m over it.”
You were doing it wrong. But then, if it’s true you had no choice. Did you choose to be over it? Or was that inevitable too? Is your brain, and all its influences, determining that you now reject determinism? How can you tell the difference between a genuine freely willed choice, and a determined outcome that feels like a freely willed choice? This is the dilemma facing believers in free will.